The Afghan debacle is becoming a case study of how political debate in Versailles drips in a naturally self-organizing way to protect the dysfunctional status quo. As I indicated yesterday and in September, the fundamental flaw that set the stage for the current policy making fiasco was the unexamined analytical hole in General McChrystal’s escalation strategy — namely, its dependence of the rapid expansion of the corrupt and ineffective Afghan national security forces.
McChrystal did not analyze this corruption/ineffectiveness issue, but that crucial omission was ignored the hoorah accompanying the immediate leaking of report by his allies buried somewhere in the Versailles apparat. The only alternative that surfaced during cacophony of the ensuing months, the so-called Biden plan, was equally reckless, because it also glossed over this analytical hole by advocating that we substitute a greater reliance on robotic drones for boots on the ground (drones create their own problems) and further accelerate training of the Afghan forces. With Versailles leaking like a sieve, the debate became a ridiculous fact-free exercise in macho venting.
Now, it is beginning to look like Ambassador Eikenberry (a former Army general and possibly an adult to boot) has moved to pull everyone’s fat out of the fire by blaming the chaos in the escalation debate on corruption by the Karzai government (true enough), but not surprisingly, this blame is being treated implicitly in Versailles as if were a new development that has arisen suddenly since McChrystal’s supporters leaked his fatally flawed report. In this “new” rush of developments, the attached report in the Times [UK] can be forgiven if it inadvertently helps to reinforce the collective amnesia, because it does not connect the dots to link the obvious flaws in the original McChrystal strategy and the cynical leaking of that report which together put the whole dripping circus into motion.
Mr. Obama is in a no win situation, and the time to cut his losses is past due. Hopefully, he has learned a lesson and heads will roll. But I fear the more likely outcome will be double down with some form of mushy middle course, possibly adorned with Mr. Karzai’s carcass twisting slowly in the wind, that protects everyone in Versailles, if only in the short term.
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Posted in Strategy | Tagged 4th Generation Warfare, Afghanistan, Franklin C Spinney, Poor American Strategy | 4 Comments »
This is by far the most precise, well written piece written on why the war in Afghanistan is leading to failure and why those who support it are self promoting themselves in keeping it going.
I am proud Chuck Spinney is a mentor and friend.
Don
[ Note: I added some hot links to the attached article to assist readers in understanding some the background underpinning my argument. CS ]
November 12, 2009
Obama and the Triumph of the Will The Afghan War Question By FRANKLIN C. SPINNEY
http://www.counterpunch.org/spinney11122009.html
Marmaris, Turkey.
In the opening lines of the oldest treatise on the conduct of war, Sun Tzu said that the question of war is vital to the state, and therefore, it is imperative to study it. This timeless advice has been been ignored repeatedly by the United States since the end of WWII. The inevitable result has been an insensible rise of war mongering, fueled by arrogance and ignorance, culminating in the chaotic spectacle now enveloping the Afghan War Question in Washington.
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Posted in Strategy, Uncategorized | Tagged 4th Generation Warfare, Chet Richards and Straegy, Franklin C Spinney, Sun Tzu, U.S. Strategy, War in Afghanistan, William S. Lind | Leave a Comment »
On War # 321: 4GW Comes to Ft. Hood
William S. Lind 10 November 2009
Last week’s shootings at Ft. Hood, in which thirteen U. S. Soldiers were killed and 30 people wounded, appear to be a classic example of Fourth Generation war.
The shooter, U. S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, was a practicing Muslim. He sometimes wore traditional Islamic dress and carried a Koran. He reportedly cried “Allahu Akbar” before he opened fire.
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Posted in Adaptability, Learning Organizations | Tagged 4th Generation Warfare, Fort Hood shootings, William S. Lind | 2 Comments »
My friend and September leader of the month Winslow Wheeler is now writing for Huffington Post. He points out in this article, while most Senators have no care for supporting Pork at the cost to our troops, a few Senators are showing character and leadership. One of them is Senator Tom Coburn from Oklahoma. Read on and as I do, pray we start to see some leadership regardless of short gain, for the long term health of our military and country.
Don
Tuesday, the Senate passed its version of the DOD Appropriations bill. Bereft of a debate on Afghanistan, the Senators busied themselves exercising their default activity: porking up defense spending and slapping down those with the ethics to oppose them.
This year, the leadership of the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, Senators Inouye and Cochran, sank to a new low. But also, some events in this year’s debate (actually, there was not much of that) offer a ray of hope that we may be witnessing the high tide of the Pork Uber Alles era. I provide details below. I have been asked by the Huffington Post to join them as one of their blogger/commentators. My new piece on the Senate porkers is my inaugural piece for the Huffington Post, which they are now running at their politics home page. Find it at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/winslow-t-wheeler/support-our-troops-the-se_b_314393.html, and below.
Please feel free to leave a comment there or to send it to me directly. There is more to come on what Congress is doing to our defenses this year. I look forward to writing about this in the coming weeks.
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Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Congressional Pork, Huffington Post, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), Winslow Wheeler | Leave a Comment »
Ron Paul was my favorite for President. He raised more money than any other candidate in the Republican primary, the highest of active duty military contributions. He won every debate. But why was he not selected to represent the Republican party?
Why, because the Washington Establishment, big money, lobbyists and special interest, does not want a man that is smart, has strength of character, and most of all understands the Constitution better than anyone in Congress, for that matter in Washington.
So, the media, backed and funded by big money, made sure that they isolated and kept Ron Paul out of the public’s eye. I first noticed it when Ron Paul debated successfully all the other Republican candidates in early 2008, and was given little time by the sponsors.
So, we don’t own our country anymore, unless, you have a lot of money, so you can buy the policies and politicans you want. Instead of measuring success as being a good citizen today, we measure success by how much money and things you own.
I agree with Ron Paul’s recommendation for foreign policy. As they said, what brought down the Soviet Union was two things, it over spent on its defense, and blue jeans and rock and roll.
I am for a strong defense, but one not modelled on the one we have today. My military is tough, equipped with rugged, well tested and as- simple as can be equipment; its an expeditionary force with little overhead with the centerpiece of personnel policies being unit cohesion and leaders selected through a tough accessions process (my ratio of officers to the force is 5%). A military that can go in, punish the threat, leave a calling card, then pull out, while handing it over to those who own the country (Read my 2002 book Path to Victory for the details).
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Posted in Strategy | Tagged Ron Paul, Ron Paul is isolated by the media | 2 Comments »
Two opinions on Afghanistan which I recommend everybody read:
Reform or go home, by David Kilcullen in yesterday’s New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/opinion/04afghanistan.html
Pretty much sums it up — it’s the Afghans’ problem. Although I think his emphasis on early elections is misplaced (in IWCKI, I quote Lee Kuan Yew as observing that elections may be the end point of an evolution to democracy, but the are not the beginning), his point that it’s all about governance is hard to dispute. Of course, “governance” is the one thing that outsiders cannot provide. Draw your own conclusions.
Theories about 4GW are not yet like the laws of thermodynamics, by Fabius Maximus, a reprint from March 2008.
http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2009/10/04/internal-6/
Fab reminds us that what we’re involved in in Afghanistan is not 4GW for the most part but “counterinsurgency,” that is, interfering in somebody else’s civil war, and occupation (a losing game, at least since the end of WW II).
The 4GW part — attacking the remnants of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan — is a very small part of it, requiring at most a few hundred troops. If this seems low, ask yourself: How many al-Qa’ida, that is, fighters under the command of OBL and his staff, are there? How are they organized and equipped?
So why would we need more than a battalion of US special operations forces, marines, or armored cav to defeat them? Finding and eliminating them might require an awful lot of other types of people, but relatively few combat forces.
Posted in Strategy | Tagged 4th Generation Warfare, Afghanistan War, David Kilcullen, Fabius Maximus, Insurgency | Leave a Comment »
Please tell me why the historian’s report on this needs to be reviewed and “revised” and then redone by Petraeus.
Oh, never mind; now I understand; a senator (Webb) is involved. Webb may have the background to understand all this, but I will bet any of you lunch that the only person who testifies on this to the esteemed Senate Armed Services Committee has eagles or better on his shoulders and certainly will not be the original historian author. To permit otherwise would impede the SASC staff from groveling for jobs in the Pentagon.
The key questions of who we are really fighting and why we are fighting them are simply ignored. Similar questions were not asked in Iraq either with the result that we made war on the Sunni Arab population until we and they found it advantageous to stop it. AQ in Iraq did not turn out to be the monolithic powerhouse the generals insisted they were. The Sunni’s had good reason to cooperate. We had stupidly established an Iranian-backed government in Baghdad the Sunni Arabs wanted to survive and potentially destroy in our eventual absence. Without Sunni Arab support, AQ became irrelevant. We could not take the casualties and stay in Iraq. Hence, the cash for cooperation strategy, not COIN, worked.
In Afghanistan, we are once again killing lots of people who are not the enemies of the United States . They are simply killing us because we are there. Meanwhile, AQ is not there nor is AQ in Waziristan the powerful force claimed. But we cannot buy off the Pashtun Tribes the way we bought off the Sunni Arabs. The Iraqi conditions don’t exist in Afghanistan . The whole business is depressing.
U.S. Review Of Battle Disaster Sways Strategy On Afghanistan
New York Times October 3, 2009
U.S. Review Of Battle Disaster Sways Strategy On Afghanistan By Thom Shanker WASHINGTON
The paratroopers of Chosen Company had plenty to worry about as they began digging in at their new outpost on the fringe of a hostile frontier village in eastern Afghanistan. Intelligence reports were warning of militants massing in the area. As the paratroopers looked around, the only villagers they could see were men of fighting age idling in the bazaar. There were no women and children, and some houses looked abandoned. Through their night scopes they could see furtive figures on the surrounding mountainsides.
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Posted in Adaptability, Decision Making, How to develop adaptability, Learning Organizations | Tagged 4th Generation Warfare, Adaptability Development, Afghanistan War | 3 Comments »
September 30, 2009 by don
I have been thinking from a leadership prospective about the health care argument going on in Washington. I have had some ideas, posted a few articles on my blog over the summer, but until now, I have not been able to find an answer to the health care reform. By the way, it is not what the policians in Washington are proposing!
In my travels throughout the nation, I have been blessed to meet several good citizens and leaders. One of them is Dave Hubbard, as well as his wife Melinda. If you recall Dave and Melinda took the dog Darlene that I rescued last year when I was travelling through Northern Georgia touring Civil War sites. Since then, we have forged a friendship, and they and Darlene have been blessed with each other (See my post ”Saving Darlene,” September 2008).
Dave Hubbard, former NFL Offensive Lineman, Minister and now a Fitness and Motivational Expert has just published a book that provides a blue print for America’s health care crisis, called Fat to Fit. Dave gets at the heart of what I have been trying to say, but have not found a way to say it-that health care reform as the politicians want to do it will make our own health (mental and physical) worse. We must start with ourselves to reform our health care.
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Posted in Adaptability, Leadership, Learning Organizations, Professional Development | Tagged America's Fitness Coach, Dave Hubbard, Health Care Reform, Saving Darlene | 6 Comments »
September 30, 2009 by don
On War #317: Keeping Our Infantry Alive William S. Lind 29 September 2009
The headline of the September 23 Washington Post read, “Less Peril for Civilians, but More for Troops.” The theme of the article was that restrictions General Stanley McChrystal has imposed on the use of supporting arms in Afghanistan, with the objective of reducing Afghan civilian casualties, have increased American casualties. The Post reported that since General McChrystal issued his directive on July 2, the number of Afghan civilians killed by coalition forces dropped to 19, from 151 for the same period last year. At the same time, U.S. troop deaths rose from 42 to 96. Not surprisingly, Congress is interested: the Post quotes Senator Susan Collins of Maine as saying, “I am troubled if we are putting our troops at greater risk in order to go to such extremes to avoid Afghan casualties.” Congress is unlikely to understand what General McChrystal knows very well, namely that firepower-intensive American tactics, especially heavy use of artillery and airstrikes, will lose us the war.
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Posted in Adaptability, How to develop adaptability | Tagged Afghanistan War, Generations of War, On War, William S. Lind | 1 Comment »
September 26, 2009 by don
William S. Lind, 22 September 2009
The Washington Post yesterday made available an unclassified version of General Stanley McChrystal’s long-awaited report on the war in Afghanistan. Politically, the report is bold, in that it acknowledges the enemy has the initiative and we have been fighting the war – for eight years – in counterproductive ways. But intellectually, both as analysis and as prescription, it is five pounds of substance in a 50 pound bag.
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Posted in Adaptability, Strategy | Tagged 4th Generation Warfare, General MCChrystal, Strategy, The campaign in Afghanistan, William S. Lind | 12 Comments »
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