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Archive for August, 2009

William S. Lind

25 August 2009

The war in Afghanistan appears to have settled into the category Delbrueck called “wars of exhaustion.” If it remains there, the U.S. cannot win. The American people will become exhausted long before the Pashtun do. In this respect America’s situation is similar to that Germany faced in World War I. Germany knew she could not win a war of exhaustion. She therefore sought to turn it into a war of maneuver, successfully on the eastern front and almost successfully in the west in the spring of 1918 and also at sea with the U-boat campaign. The ultimate failure of the latter two efforts, an operational failure on land and, worse, a grand strategic failure at sea, meant the war of exhaustion. 

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http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200909/fema

Once a month, I will post something about a great leader, someone who by their selfless service, hard work, intellegence, and foresight, are contributing to our society.

The month of August’s leader is the new FEMA leader Craig Fugate. This was one of the President’s good appointments. Unlike, and in contrast the one he made for the number 2 job at the Pentagon, William Lynn. Mr. Fugate is a leader in the truest since. He has risen though hard work and innovation. But, he holds himself and his people to standard. I am proud that the President put him in this critical job. FEMA, like most agencies in the government, goes to people who are great politicians, rich or both, but have little or no skills in the organization they are leading. And because they are good ass kissers, make poor leaders. Mr. Fugate is just the opposite. He understands his role of a big government organization, that is to push responsibility for action down to the local levels. This is where the decision cycle will be fastest. It is guys like Mr. Fugate that give me hope for our nation.

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Craig Fugate, the new head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under President Barack Obama, is an unusual choice for the job, historically speaking. Unlike many of his predecessors, most famously Michael “Heckuva Job” Brown under President George W. Bush, Fugate (pronounced few-gate) has experience in the relevant subject matter. A former firefighter, Fugate managed disasters for 20 years in Florida, the fiasco capital of America. Even more bizarrely for FEMA, often a dumping ground for friends of the powerful, Fugate has no political connections to Obama. Instead, he got his job the old-fashioned way—when Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano was looking for candidates, people kept mentioning his name. He has a reputation for telling it like it is—in a field where “it” is usually bad. And what Fugate has to say may come as strong medicine for his fellow citizens, nine out of 10 of whom now live in a place at significant risk for some kind of disaster.

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My apologies for being absent for a while. After a lot of travel to push ALM at different locations, I returned home to assist my wife in readying for major surgery this Monday the 31st of August to clear blockage from her Aerota, and put stints in her two legs so she can walk without pain again.

That brings up another point, why or how does health care reform parallel leadership and leader development? Well, it does. My fear is as our government gets larger and larger, that the responsibility for people’s actions or their decisions are taken from the individual to a larger, removed group of people disinterested or removed from impacts of those decisions on the individual. People become more dependent on the goverment for everything, simplier and simplier decisions get pushed higher.  What does this do to leadership and our society?

Well, it diminishes risk taking, people become more risk averse, just look at the way the use of “red lights” in place of smart traffic management has killed driver initiative, as well as made most of us dumber drivers. On a bigger note, my fear of health care reform, the approach that the President is taking, is that people are getting divorced from their own care and responsibility for their own care. They do not pay for the decisions they make.

Obesity is a dangerous example. A recent report, and I don’t have the link, confirmed my fear. That more governmental control of health decisions will mean more fat asses out there. People will be more divorced for paying for their bad decisions if the government can step in and pay for your mistakes (they don’t pay for it, we all do). It also discourages initiative on those who do work hard. Why do I work hard to pay taxes to pay for the “fat ass that is sitting or laying on the couch stuffing his mouth with crystal creams.

I get the Altantic Monthly, thanks to my friend James Fallow. I love the magazine. But this month, I read, yesterday, in the waiting room while my wife was being tested for her surgery, the best article I have read on health care reform, called “How American Health Care Killed My Father” by David Goldhill.

In sum David says that the current system and its proposed reforms, encourage the wrong kind of initiatives, to the insurance companies, while ignoring customer services, discourages competition (think of this as free play force on force exercises), encourages all the wrong actions, as will get worse under the proposed reforms. Again, I think the President means well, but too much compromise. The system, as David says, needs reform, but in a totall different direction. It needs to put health care back in the hands of the individual, while encouraging competition to manage costs.

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200909/health-care

Look forward toward you comments.

Don

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Auerback Trilogy: Is Weimar America About to Auger In?

That more an more people are becoming fed up with the incestuous let-them-eat-cake politics of Versailles on the Potomac and Versailles on the Hudson raises the possibility of some kind of insurrection, be it from the left or the right or both. In the August 14-16 edition of Counterpunch, my good friend Marshall Auerback analyzed the possibility a massive repudiation of debt by private mortgage holders. That article built on his 11 August article in Counterpunch, where where he described the extent to which mortgage holders (average consumers) are being financially busted by the mutually reinforcing pressures of rising mortgage payment delinquencies (implying increasing pressure for foreclosures) coupled with rapidly declining housing values. Now, in a third article (attached below), Marshall takes his persuasive analysis one step further to describe why he sees (but does not advocate) an increasing possibility that large numbers of angry taxpayers may refuse to pay their taxes — in effect going on strike to protest what they believe to be outrageous unfairness in a political system that is more an agent of a predator oligarchy rather than a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. The Auerback Scenario, a real albeit remote possibility at this time, would bring into question the very legitimacy of the state. So, fasten your seat belts, because President Obama and his demagogic politics of hope and change may be about to auger in, taking the rest of us with him. And that would raise a stew of fear and possibility that would wet the appetites of any Lenin or Hitler wannabes waiting in the wings.

Chuck Spinney Mytilene, Nisos Lesovs, Greece

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Lind is right about the Pentagon being a bank. It’s a really brilliant formulation.

However, Lind misunderstands the nature of current conflict. What is happening in Iraq or Afghanistan does not fit into some new, nifty paradigm whether called “hybrid war” or fourth generation war or any other loaded term. Contemporary military interventions in the name of Neocon ideology and Wilsonian state building have simply deteriorated into conflicts between modernity and the past. In this case, the past is Islamic culture. Left alone, the backward culture of Islam will die in time, but we are extending its life by attacking it.

Because these conflicts between modernity and antiquity are strategically irrelevant to American national interest, we play at war, turning to cheap, easy ways to suppress the unhappy recipients of the modernization our forces bring without risking American losses that would otherwise alert the American people to the pointless loss of American blood and treasure. To pretend otherwise is delusional. It’s ultimately why involving ourselves in places where our interests do not support the use of force should be avoided. Most of the top generals know this, but they lack the moral courage to stand up and say so. This is the message Lind should have delivered, not some imaginary treatise on equally imaginary fourth generational warfare.

Instead, without necessarily intending to do so, Lind subsidizes the delusional thinking so prominent in the contemporary ground force, the thinking that first, creates, then, wages imaginary fourth generational warfare at huge expense to the American people. Tragically, Lind is exhorting the infantrymen carrying 60 pound packs to chase poorly armed Muslim insurgents, (whoops, I mean fourth Generation warriors) through alleys and valleys in remote places that don’t count. He’s helping to cultivate the myth that mastering a few phrases in Pashtun or Arabic will transform the masses of scared young men with rifles in the Marines and the Army into culturally sensitive TE Lawrences who will win hearts and minds. Nonsense.

The insurgents in fourth generation warfare survive not because they are clever or because we are stupid. They survive because we have no compelling national strategic interest that justifies their annihilation along with the population that supports them. If we did have such a compelling national strategic interest, we would utterly destroy them the way we smashed the Confederacy, the way we annihilated the American Indian (whoops, I mean native American) and others who fell into that dead end category. Every great power metes out this treatment to so-called insurgents who make the mistake of challenging the State and its Army on strategic ground that matters.

Cell phones, IEDs and cyber attacks don’t matter when the State and its Army set out to secure vital strategic interests. If necessary, villages and peoples vanish, but the State and its Army live on. Ask the French insurgents in the Vendee who resisted Napoleon or Pugachev’s Cossacks and Tartars what happened to them? Ask the gallant insurgent defenders of Warsaw in 1945 what happened to them?

They will not answer. Why? They are all dead. In this sense, we are discussing military power up to, but not necessarily including nuclear weapons. We normally call these forces conventional military power.

Had Fallujah stood on the border between Mexico and the United States, it would have vanished along with most of its recalcitrant population. It would have been an enduring object lesson for anyone south of the Border who toyed with the idea of killing Americans on America’s doorstep. The problem for American policy makers is that Fallujah stands in Iraq . In Iraq, it’s just not that important. As a result, we dithered. Eventually, we paid off the insurgents turning the Sheikhs of Anbar into millionaires.

On the other hand, Lind is absolutely right about the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps clings to dismounted infantry assaults that maximize American casualties while belatedly using other forms of firepower – armor, artillery or air power – as a way to rescue the otherwise costly infantry assaults from inevitable failure. A quick read of Cobra II or, for that matter, any Marine Corps operation over the last 70 years demonstrates this unhappy fact. To General Lem Shepherd’s lasting credit, after the carnage on Tarawa, he and Shoup insisted on the introduction of tanks into the Marine Corps. Tanks and air power dominated the fighting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but only the few surviving Marine veterans of those battles will relate in private how these capabilities destroyed the WW I quality Japanese Army troops and saved countless Marine lives. Listen to the CMC today and you’d never guess it. The same experience was repeated by the Army in the Philippines.

The Army is often just as guilty of wasting precious American lives as seen in the Ardennes, or in the opening days of the Korean War because some idiot with stars on his shoulder decided Korea was unsuited to the use of armor. It took the North Koreans to correct that thinking. The mentality surfaced again in the opening months of Vietnam when armor was excluded on similar grounds. In time, American casualties mounted and the Infantry generals were compelled to commit armor. Mogadishu where Rangers and Delta Force macho men insisted on operating without armored fighting forces or air power was a more recent example of the same criminal stupidity.

Our military cemeteries are full of the victims of this thinking. This is why drones along with bombers, precision guided munitions, tanks, rocket artillery and fuel air explosives are all good things that should be used without hesitation if they preserve American life; especially in conflicts like today’s conflicts; conflicts that do not involve vital American strategic interests. Meanwhile, we owe it to the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who are the victims in these stupid, wasteful conflicts to stop the stupidity that put them in harm’s way. I suspect, if John Boyd were alive, after shaking his head in disgust over the stupidity of our foolish involvement in both the Middle East and Afghanistan , he would concur.

In battle, killing the enemy before he gets a chance to kill you is the only logic that makes sense. No one who has been under fire and subsequently killed an enemy at close range in combat gives a F-ck how the enemy died, only that the SOB is dead and no longer a threat to him. Perhaps if Lind had ever seen combat, he would think differently about the use of technology in war. But he has never been in uniform, never seen action and it shows.

End of sermon.

Thanks, Doug Macgregor

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Subject: Droning On — Remote-Controlled Mayhem Does Not Win Wars.

The American Conservative
September 2009 Issue

Droning On

Remote-Controlled Mayhem Does Not Win Wars.

William S. Lind

When TAC asked me for a piece on military drones, I had to consider which variety of drone was most important: the drone aircraft, the drones who operate the aircraft, or the drones back in the Pentagon who think drive-by shootings can win wars.

Drone aircraft are simply model airplanes. It would be easy enough to construct one from parts picked up at a toy store. Kitbash a small video camera that can broadcast an image—some model trains now have one in the engine cab—onto a remote-controlled model aircraft big enough to carry it, and you have a useful military drone. (Paintballers take note.) In fact, you have the most useful type of military drone, a reconnaissance drone. For millennia, commanders have wanted nothing quite so much as an ability to see over the next hill. A simple drone can do that nicely.

In the Pentagon, “simple” is a bad word because it implies cheap. The Pentagon is not a military headquarters; it is a bank. Its main mission is to add to the money flow. Simple systems do that poorly. Therefore, American military drones have grown rapidly in complexity and cost, far beyond what a company or battalion commander needs to see over the next hill. The Predator is perhaps the most famous of a growing family of drone aircraft. Not only does it take pictures, it also carries air-to-ground missiles it can shoot with great precision out of the night sky at gatherings of Taliban fighters, compounds serving as IED factories, and Afghan wedding parties.

What’s wrong with that? Yes, we have to say “sorry” when a Predator turns a wedding into multiple funerals. But who would not want to be able to strike enemy targets swiftly and silently with no risk to an American pilot? Is this not military technology at its best?

To answer these questions, we must grasp a basic fact about war that the American military cannot understand, namely that there is more to it than putting firepower on targets. American military doctrine—with the exception of the Marine Corps—is Second Generation doctrine, sometimes called firepower/attrition warfare. Derived from French Army doctrine of the interwar years, it reduces war to putting fire on targets in a contest of mutual attrition: think Verdun. The French summarized it as “the firepower conquers, the infantry occupies.” Seen from the perspective of that doctrine, Predators firing missiles are entirely a plus. Other than those pesky wedding parties, they have no negatives. Remember, high cost is another benefit.

The problem, as the French discovered in 1940 when they faced a Third Generation German army with a doctrine of maneuver warfare, is that Second Generation doctrine is deeply flawed. War is the most complex of all human endeavors. It can seldom be reduced to a mere contest in mutual attrition. Col. John Boyd, USAF, America’s greatest military theorist, observed:

When I was a young officer, I was told that if you have land superiority, air superiority, and sea superiority, you win. Well, in Vietnam , we had land, air, and sea superiority, and we lost. So there is obviously something more to it.

Boyd went on to explore and explain what that “more” is. He posited that war is fought on three levels: physical, mental, and moral. The physical level, where Second Generation focuses, is the weakest. The moral level, on which guerrilla war centers, is the most powerful. And the mental level, the basis of maneuver warfare, lies somewhere in between.

The primacy of the moral level carries over from classical guerrilla warfare into Fourth Generation war, the type of war we are fighting in Iraq , Afghanistan, and, thanks to those wonderful Predators, in Pakistan . The defining characteristic of Fourth Generation is that it is multi-sided and many of the parties are not states. Some nonstate entities may fight for political goals, but many do not. Instead, their goals may range from martyrdom to loot to impressing the local girls. In the Fourth Generation, war moves beyond Clausewitz’s politics carried on by other means. For many of the entities waging such wars, the moral level replaces the political. It is power on the moral level that brings recruits, money, good press, and, perhaps, victory.

In Fourth Generation wars, one of the most important factors on the moral level is what Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld calls the power of weakness. A state, especially a major power such as the United States , is incomparably stronger physically than its Fourth Generation enemies. The U.S. military has the fanciest weapons in the world, including the Predator. The Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the like are armed mostly with light weapons of World War II design. Our troops have the latest body armor, excellent medical care if they are wounded, and base camps with all the comforts of home. Our opponents fight in bathrobes and flipflops, usually die or are captured if wounded, and live the life of scavengers.

To themselves and onlookers, they are David and the U.S. is Goliath. In the 3,000 or so years that the biblical story has been told, how many listeners have identified with the giant?

Here we begin to see why Osama should have on his cave wall a picture of the Predator with the line under it, “Our best weapon.” Maybe he does. Perhaps no other weapon so well represents the conflict between al-Qaeda’s David and the American Goliath. The Predator strikes in the night with no warning. Its missiles can instantly pulverize an entire mud-brick compound. There is no defense against it other than hiding. If by a miracle our opponents shoot one down, they do us no injury. The drone operator sits in air-conditioned comfort in Tampa or some similar garden spot. With the Predator and with airstrikes generally, Americans fight from a safe distance. Like the Trojan hero Paris, who was an archer, we appear to be cowards.

Seen from John Boyd’s physical/ mental/moral vantage point, the Predator is a stunning success physically. It may terrify our enemies mentally. But on the moral level, it is a boomerang. Those on the receiving end say, “I’m going to get back at the murdering cowards no matter what it costs.” Their families, friends, fellow tribesmen, and co-religionists around the world have the same reaction. The Predator calls forth its low-tech, Fourth Generation counterpart and nemesis, the suicide bomber.

Here we see the broader failing in the American military, an error that had its origin in the idea that war is a firepower-based attrition contest, but has since taken on a life of its own. That is the assumption, usually unstated but now so widespread that it underlies everything the Pentagon does, that wars’ outcomes are determined by technology. The fact that complex technology is a great justifier of higher budgets may not be irrelevant to this notion’s popularity.

Van Creveld’s book Technology and War, a historical survey, concludes that very few wars have been decided by technology. Boyd sums up the reason: “Weapons don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their minds.”

One consequence of this fact is that most high-tech weapons systems have simple, low-tech counters. A classic example comes from the “McNamara Line” in the Vietnam War, a collection of high-tech sensors in the jungles that was supposed to pick up any Viet Cong movements. One sophisticated sensor was designed to detect human odors. The VC countered it by hanging buckets of urine in trees.

The Taliban’s most successful counter to the Predator is of similar simplicity. They make sure that when they gather and thus provide a good target, they have plenty of women and children around. In effect, they say, “Go ahead, make my day.”

Because complex weapons are expensive, they are usually in service for a long time, sometimes decades. Soon after their introduction, most if not all of their operating characteristics are known, especially in the age of the Internet. Our opponents can invent and deploy generations of simple countermeasures during the lifetime of one high-tech system. They are “outcycling us,” in Boydian terms: they can go through many cycles of observing, orienting, deciding, and acting against our systems while the systems go through only a single cycle. Boyd argued that there are few more certain prescriptions for defeat.

In contrast, simple systems, such as those our Fourth Generation opponents rely on, can go through many Boyd cycles in a comparatively short time. We see this face on display in Iraq and Afghanistan with the deadly weapon we face, the Improvised Explosive Device. Our opponents continually and rapidly invent and deploy new generations of IED, with new warhead designs, triggering mechanisms, and camouflage techniques. The U.S. has a multibillion-dollar top-priority program to counter them, most of it focused on high-tech solutions. (Again, think budget justification.) It has had small successes, but if you ask many of our troops what their mission is, they reply, “Driving around and waiting to get blown up.”

The disadvantageous time factor—no factor is more critical in war; Napoleon said, “I may lose a battle, but I will never lose a minute”—is compounded in hi-tech systems by the fact that their designers are engineers, few of whom have any understanding of war. War and engineering are not merely different, they are opposite in nature. A river cannot think how to counter an engineer who is building a bridge across it. War, in contrast, is continually shaped in unexpected ways by what soldiers call “the independent, hostile will of the enemy.” That means the other guy keeps doing things you never imagined. Complex weapons systems cannot deal with situations not envisioned by their designers. A striking example of their problem surfaced shortly after a U.S. Aegis cruiser shot down an Iranian passenger aircraft over the Persian Gulf. Aegis,a shipboard anti-aircraft and anti-missile system, is one of the most expensive weapons systems in the American military inventory. We have spent, and continue to spend, tens of billions of dollars for ships that carry Aegis as their main armament. A designer of the Aegis system wrote to the Naval Institute Proceedings to exculpate his creation, saying, “Of course, it was never designed to deal with ambiguity.” The independent, hostile will of the enemy means that ambiguity is a constant companion in war.

Ambiguity, deception, surprise, camouflage, and ambush have characterized war since its prehistoric beginnings and always will. Complex, high-technology weapons systems have trouble with all of them. They work best in clean, simple environments, like the carefully contrived “tests” the Pentagon uses to convince Congress to keep the money flowing.

Air and sea warfare are comparatively clean and simple, and high technology plays an important role there. The land warfare environment, in contrast, is vastly “dirtier.” Nowhere is it more so than in Fourth Generation wars, where the line between military and civilian is blurred to the vanishing point. In that endlessly complex setting, high-technology systems often trip over their own numerous feet even before the enemy has had a go at them. Just ask one of our company or battalion commanders what he thinks of our wonderful, computerized command and control system. One told me that it required him to submit more than 100 reports per day. Several years ago, I was in a meeting in which a retired general extolled the contribution his part of that system had made to “victory” in Iraq . The commander of the famous “Thunder Run” into downtown Baghdad said the first thing he did was turn it off.

The Pentagon’s financially self-serving belief that technology wins wars has come to grief in the sands of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan, just as it did in Vietnam. In the early days of that war, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was interviewed by the French journalist Régis Debray, who asked him what the French experience in Vietnam meant for the Americans. McNamara replied that what had happened to the French could never happen to the Americans. It was not a matter of bravery, he said, but of technology.

In contrast, John Boyd argued that for winning wars, people are most important, ideas come second, and hardware comes third. The Pentagon stints our people to feed its hardware programs, while the pursuit of technological solutions to every problem stifles creative thinking about tactics and doctrine. The American military promotion system washes out the combat leaders, who tend to have rough edges, in favor of bureaucrats and managers who can run big weapons programs and testify smoothly before Congress. In pursuit of the foxfire of victory through technology, America has forgotten the basics of war.

While the Predator and other drones in the air are killing Taliban, the drones in the Pentagon are killing us.
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I love going up to West Point, NY this time of year, but anytime. I am so blessed. This is my fifth trip in the last year.
I have now made friends up there, as well as love working with the leaders and cadre of the Department of Military Instruction (DMI). Also, my friend and colleque Lieutenant Fred Leland is our guest.

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http://kunstler.com/blog/2009/07/evil-syndicated.html#more

Evil Syndicated by James Kunstler

By now, everyone in that fraction of the world that pays attention to something other than American Idol and their platter of TGI Friday’s loaded potato skins knows that Goldman Sachs has been caught at another racket in the stock market: front-running trades. What a clever gambit, done with the help of the markets themselves – the Nasdaq in particular – in which information on trades is held back a fraction of a second from public view, while the data is shoveled to the computers of privileged subscribers who can execute zillions of programmed micro-trades before the rest of  the herd makes a move. This allows them to vacuum up hundreds of millions of dollars by doing absolutely nothing of value.  The old-fashioned method used by brokers was called “churning,” in which stocks were bought and sold incessantly (by phone) from the portfolios of inattentive clients merely to generate commissions.  In any sensible society – i.e. a society with an instinct for self-preservation – it would be against the law and the people doing it would be sent to prison.

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