The deep hostility of Britain’s senior military commanders in Iraq towards their American allies has been revealed in classified Government documents leaked to the Daily Telegraph.
By Andrew Gilligan
Telegraph
Published: 10:00PM GMT 22 Nov 2009
In
the papers, the British chief of staff in Iraq, Colonel J.K.Tanner, described his US military counterparts as “a group of Martians” for whom “dialogue is alien,” saying: “Despite our so-called ‘special relationship,’ I reckon we were treated no differently to the Portuguese.”
Col Tanner’s boss, the top British commander in the country, Major General Andrew Stewart, told how he spent “a significant amount of my time” “evading” and “refusing” orders from his US superiors.
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At least once, say the documents, General Stewart’s refusal to obey an order resulted in Britain’s ambassador to Washington, Sir David Manning, being summoned to the State Department for a diplomatic reprimand – of the kind more often delivered to “rogue states” such as Zimbabwe or the Sudan.
The frank statements were made in official interviews conducted by the Ministry of Defence with Army commanders who had just returned from Operations Telic 2 and 3 – the first, crucial year of “peacekeeping” operations in Iraq, from May 2003 to May 2004.
The disclosures come the day before the Chilcot inquiry is due to begin public hearings into Britain’s involvement in Iraq. Among the issues it will investigate is the UK-US relationship.
The leaked documents paint a vivid picture of the clash between what General Stewart described as “war-war” American commanders and their British counterparts, who he said preferred a “jaw-jaw” approach.
General Stewart bluntly admitted that “our ability to influence US policy in Iraq seemed to be minimal.” He said that “incredibly,” there was not even a secure communication link between his headquarters in Basra and the US commander, General Rick Sanchez, in Baghdad.
Col Tanner said that General Sanchez “only visited us once in seven months.” Col Tanner also added that he only spoke to his own US counterpart, the chief of staff at the US corps headquarters in the Green Zone, once over the same period.
Top British commanders angrily described in the documents how they were not even told, let alone consulted, about major changes to US policy which had significant implications for them and their men.
When the Americans decided, in March 2004, to arrest a key lieutenant of the Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr – an event that triggered an uprising throughout the British sector – “it was not co-ordinated with us and no-one [was] told that it was going to happen,” said the senior British field commander at the time, Brigadier Nick Carter.
“Had we known, we would at least have been able to prepare the ground.” Instead, “the consequence [was] that my whole area of operations went up in smoke… as a result of coalition operations that were outwith my control or knowledge and proved to be the single most awkward event of my tour.”
Among the most outspoken officers was Col Tanner, who served as chief of staff to General Stewart and of the entire British division during Operation Telic 3, from November 2003 to May 2004.
He said: “The whole system was appalling. We experienced real difficulty in dealing with American military and civilian organisations who, partly through arrogance and partly through bureaucracy, dictate that there is only one way: the American way.
“I now realise that I am a European, not an American. We managed to get on better…with our European partners and at times with the Arabs than with the Americans. Europeans chat to each other, whereas dialogue is alien to the US military… dealing with them corporately is akin to dealing with a group of Martians.
“If it isn’t on the PowerPoint slide, then it doesn’t happen.”
Gen Stewart was more diplomatic, but said: “As the world’s only superpower, they [the US] will not allow their position to be challenged. Negotiation is often a dirty word.”
Gen Stewart added: “I spent a significant amount of my time ‘consenting and evading’ US orders… Things got sticky…when I refused to conduct offensive operations against [al-Sadr’s] Mahdi Army as directed [by the US]. This resulted in the UK being demarched by the US, by [Paul] Bremer [the US proconsul in Iraq] through State [the US State Department] to the UK Ambassador in Washington.”
A “demarche” in this context was a formal diplomatic reprimand of a kind not normally handed out to friendly allies such as Britain. Gen Stewart said that the US military “were mortified” that it had got so far and said he “was always fully supported in the UK by the Chief of Defence Staff and Chief of Joint Operations.”
Yesterday the Sunday Telegraph told how leaked “post-operational reports” detailed major shortcomings in the planning and execution of the war and peacekeeping phases.
Most of the documents – apart from some which might compromise sources – referred to yesterday and today are published online at Telegraph.co.uk
And the SAGA continues!
[…] the Americans treated them in Iraq. Of course, when you are making stunning statements like ‘..the top British commander in the country, Major General Andrew Stewart, told how he spent “a sig….’, and you cut and run from the theatre of war before the job is done, you can hardly wonder […]
How interesting . Brit actions in Basra have been criticised in UK newspapers too . I supposed the mil. hadnt been able to refute because they werent allowed to comment.
For a start they knew few citizens in UK backed the Iraq action. They knew that whether Saddam had WMD or not , his delivery systems would only reach Cypress ,with a backwind , not London .They only went to Iraq because they had to go where they were sent , and hadnt managed to talk the gov out of it .
Secondly , they had no intention staying ( been there before , did that , didnt work , left ) so I’d guess it made sense to allow the non-Baathist group that looked most likely to win , win . Which at the time was al-Sadr . Large numbers of the police the Brits were supposed to be training , turned out to support al-Sadr .
Al-Sadr might yet gain power . His group may be more nationalistic over the oil . More linked to Iran . But this doesnt cause Brits to lose sleep . Road diesel is £5 ($8 ) a gallon here , who cares where it comes from !
Many of us detest the EU . But yes , some Americans make us be proud to be European .
This is yet another example of how poorly led our efforts in Iraq really were in the days prior to Patraeus. There were some great leaders in the mix, of course, but LTG Sanchez tenure as the commander in Baghdad is just about universally considered to be a disaster. It isn’t surprising that he didn’t communicate well with the British in Basra . . . hell, he had a hard time communicating with subordinate American units that were only a few kilometers away! His disastrous relations with the media are also well known.
However, problems and tensions like this are hardly a new occurance. Coalition warfare is an extremely complicated business, and even during the last “good war” (WWII) our generals didn’t really get along with their British counterparts. Tension should be expected, but I sincerely hope that our top leaders have the good sense to open their ears and minds to input from our British friends — the Brits are, in reality, among the few real friends that America has in the world. Being an anglophile, I want our ‘special relationship’ to endure for all time. I have enjoyed the honor of working with British officers on several different occassions, and each time it has been an absolute pleasure. These guys are true professionals and great soldiers.
Oh, and any time you see ‘Ambassador Bremer’ in an article, you are almost certain for it to be negative. The usual suspects are all over this post: Sanchez and Bremmer. I have to believe that things are better now.
Also, one of my most hated things in the world makes an apperance . . . PowerPoint! (“If it’s not on a slide, it doesn’t happen.”) Everyone needs to read T.X. Hammes article in Armed Forces Journal about the effect that PowerPoint has been having on our Army for quite some time. I seem to remember you posting this article on your blog several months ago.