As Andy Bacevich argues so well in his new book Limits of Power, which I just finished reading, we must clean up our own backyard and restore our economic and social power before casting off in foreign ventures. These occupations are ruining us as I predicted six years ago when there were hints at invading Iraq and trying to convert Afghanistan into a democracy.
Just wish my fellow citizens would start getting more involved in what is going beyond what is occurring on the fall season in television. We must begin voting for a strong candidate with leadership capabilities beyond the two that are running for the one party with two names. I strongly believe that if people got involved, as citizenry is obligated in a true democracy to do beyond simply pulling down the voting lever in an election, we still have time to fix our catastrophic problems.
Nothing in Iraq will survive the withdrawal of US military power and the Karzai government is more corrupt and ineffective than the Saigon government was, if that’s possible. The notion that we should now extend in tennis terms the unforced errors of the past is insane.
Sadly, the author of this essay is too accurate in his assessment.
History never went away
The west’s desire to maintain world domination is incredibly arrogant. Like all moments in history, its hegemony will pass
Fyodor Lukyanov
guardian.co.uk,
Friday September 19 2008 11:00 BST
The cliche, currently in vogue, to describe events in our times as “the return of history” is a staggering example of western arrogance. Taken literally, it means everything that took place in the 1990s was not history: the tragic breakup of multinational states, accompanied by civil wars and millions of broken lives; the massacre in Rwanda; the triumph of obscurantism in Afghanistan and the religious and political rise of the developing world; the bombings of Belgrade and Baghdad; nuclear proliferation; and so on. But of course, “history” is made only in the Euro-Atlantic space, whereas everything else is part of a fringe world.
When the west scored an unexpected victory in its confrontation with the Soviet Union, it, like Dr Faust, wanted a moment to last forever and declared the end of history. But, as in Goethe’s tragedy, this feeling proved, in fact, to be a demonic temptation. This is not “the return of history,” which actually never went away, but a specific problem of whether the US retains the global leadership it received after the Cold War.
US foreign policy traditionally embraces a messianic approach; in image, guided not by selfish national interests but by ideas of freedom and democracy shaped since the its very first days. In the 20th century, this image was further corroborated during the two world wars when America came to Europe’s rescue to save it from another catastrophe.
After the Soviet Union ceased to exist, America for the first time in history had a taste of global domination, and September 11 gave a boost to the creation of an integral military-ideological strategy. Never before had measures to ensure the security of one country been global in nature. Washington raised the prospect of building a world order that would never again pose a threat to the US.
By proliferating democracy around the world, the US could ensure its own military, economic and energy security. Thus ideology merged with geostrategic tasks. Democracy turned into an instrument. The pompous words about freedom and human rights quickly began to lose any sense.
However, by the time America formed a comprehensive view on global leadership, it could no longer act regardless of what others might think. International influence began to shift to Asia; Russia recovered from its geopolitical knockout; and even US allies began to express doubts.
The hegemon’s trap is that the leader has no right to retreat even on minor issues. The inability to uphold one’s positions in a peripheral region may have a domino effect. “Swaps” with other actors are not provided for, as the global leader has no minor interests that it could waive.
As a result, for example, the desire of a strengthened Russia to discuss spheres of interests and even its readiness to make concessions on some issues runs against the US’s categorical unwillingness to move. When George Bush and Condoleezza Rice speak about the inadmissibility of a policy for delimiting spheres of influence, they mean it. From their point of view, there is only one sphere of influence – the American one, which embraces the whole world.
Therefore, the growth of the ambitions of any country poses a threat to America, which it must neutralise. This may be the build-up of China’s economic might; Europe’s feeble attempts to formulate an independent political identity; or Russia’s desire to restore its position in Eurasia.
Of course, threats are not necessarily neutralised by force; this can be done by means of a new system of interaction. But practice shows that force is given preference here. The reanimation of the factor of military force in world politics and the degradation of all international institutions, ranging from the UN and the IMF to Nato and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are the fruits of America’s leadership.
It would not be fair to blame the US alone for this, as all these organisations are the legacy of the previous epoch. They should have passed into history together with it and given way to something else. However, the “new world order” proposed by the cold war winners provided not for the creation of new structures but for the extension of the former western organisations to the whole world. But these organisations proved to be unfit for global functions.
Discussions in the west pivot on one idea – how to ensure western leadership in the new conditions. A global “concert of powers”, which would provide for the equal participation of all influential actors in the formulation of new rules of the game, is not even discussed. The best they are offered is to discuss terms on which they would recognise the west’s supremacy and benefit from that.
The return of the US from the hyperpower category into the ranks of great powers, which have a very great, yet not dominant influence on international relations, would be a step towards the restoration of balance in the world. This would require from Washington the formulation of its own national interests and the development of a system of priorities. However, attempts to retain hegemony at any cost, amidst institutional chaos, imbalance of power and the growing ambitions of other countries, would bring about new and increasingly dangerous conflicts.
Joint Strategic Assessment Team II
by Dave Dilegge
Sean Naylor of Army Times reports that General David Petraeus is planning to form a team of under 100 experts to conduct a top-to-bottom strategic assessment of US Central Command’s area of responsibility.
Petraeus tapped Col. (P) H.R. McMaster to lead the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, or JSAT, according to multiple sources.
McMaster is widely regarded as one of the Army’s most capable officers. He is the author of Dereliction of Duty, an examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s performance during the Vietnam War, and he commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in western Iraq, a deployment that came to be seen as a model of how to conduct counterinsurgency at the local level.
The team will include people from government, the military and academia.
Petraeus takes charge at CentCom on Oct. 31 and the JSAT will begin its work immediately thereafter.
Sources said the work would likely be completed in February.
General Petraeus, along with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, utilized a JSAT in 2007 that contributed much to the creation of the classified Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq. Among other recommendations the JSAT provided the framework for a new population-centric counterinsurgency strategy intended to provide a bridge for the Iraqi government and security forces to eventual handover of day to day political and security functions.
Michael Gordon of the New York Times and Ann Scott Tyson of the Washington Post reported on JSAT efforts in US Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least ’09 and New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics, respectively.
The overarching aim of the plan, which sets goals for the end of this year and the end of 2008, is more political than military: to negotiate settlements between warring factions in Iraq from the national level down to the local level. In essence, it is as much about the political deals needed to defuse a civil war as about the military operations aimed at quelling a complex insurgency, said officials with knowledge of the plan.
The groundwork for the campaign plan was laid out in an assessment formulated by Petraeus’s senior counterinsurgency adviser, David J. Kilcullen, with about 20 military officers, State Department officials and other experts in Baghdad known as the Joint Strategic Assessment Team. Their report, finished last month, was approved by Petraeus and Crocker as the basis of a formal campaign plan that will assign specific tasks for military commands and civilian agencies in Iraq.
The plan anticipates keeping US troop levels elevated into next year but also intends to significantly increase the size of the 144,000-strong Iraqi army, considered one of the more reliable institutions in the country and without which a US withdrawal would spell chaos. “You will have to do something about the sucking noise when we leave,” said a US officer familiar with the plan.
The plan has three pillars to be carried out simultaneously — in contrast to the prior sequential strategy of “clear, hold and build.” One shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi security forces — the primary focus under the former top US commander, Gen. George W. Casey Jr. — toward protecting Iraq’s population in trouble areas, a central objective of the troop increase that President Bush announced in January.
“The revised counterinsurgency approach we’re taking now really focuses on protecting those people 24/7 . . . and that competent non-sectarian institutions take the baton from us,” said Kilcullen, offering an overview of the campaign plan.
With mounting pressure to “get Afghanistan under control” and many pundits and politicians advocating an Iraq-like “surge” of US and NATO troops into that country the formation of a Central Command JSAT is very good news. A critical counterinsurgency lesson learned (and at times unlearned) is one size does not fit all and while a new strategy may include a substantial increase in ground combat forces circumstances warrant a comprehensive approach based on factors peculiar to Afghanistan.
Moreover, JSAT recommendations for Afghanistan must be an integral part of a regional strategy that includes Pakistan and India – as Dr. T.X. Hammes rightly argues in his recent Small Wars Journal blog post – The Good War?
Even worse, to date, the candidates are discussing only Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan or India. Yet both these Southwest Asian nations are much more critical to the United States future than Afghanistan. Neither candidate has questioned the wisdom of bombing, and likely destabilizing Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of almost 170 million people, in order to help our security efforts in Afghanistan. Nor has there been a discussion whether dedicating more resources to Afghanistan is more effective than dedicating different but equivalent resources to support Pakistan. This is despite the fact that 80% of the supplies for the forces we have in Afghanistan come by road directly through one of the least stable parts of Pakistan. In short, if Pakistan destabilizes we probably lose in Afghanistan – the converse is not true.
Yet, our position in Afghanistan appears to be largely shaping our policy toward Pakistan. And our actions in Pakistan inevitably have a major impact on our relationship with India — a rising nation destined to be the most important of the three.
We entered Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda’s operating forces and eliminate its training bases. We successfully eliminated the bases and hurt Al Qaeda badly. One reason often given for our presence in Afghanistan is that we must stabilize it as a nation so that Al Qaeda can never use it as a terrorist base again. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda has moved its forces and its bases into Pakistan. The subsequent conflict inside Pakistan is contributing to increasing instability in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and has greatly increased the strain on the Pakistani government.
Before we rush more troops into Afghanistan, we must answer basic questions about our strategy for the region and how our efforts in Afghanistan support that strategy. Good tactics and more troops are not a substitute for a strategy – and in fact can significantly raise the cost of a bad strategy.
While not mentioned by T.X., Iran shares a border and long history with Afghanistan and if recent reporting holds true is increasingly taking an active role in supporting the Taliban.
For additional background on the Iraq JSAT and the issues facing decision-makers in 2007 see The New Yorker’s The General’s Dilemma by Steve Coll, Newsweek Magazine’s Brainiac Brigade by Babak Dehghanpisheh and John Barry, and Dave Kilcullen’s posts here at Small Wars Journal (scroll down to 2007 entries).
Continue reading “Joint Strategic Assessment Team II”
Dave Dilegge
Small Wars Journal
Joint Strategic Assessment Team II
by Dave Dilegge
Sean Naylor of Army Times reports that General David Petraeus is planning to form a team of under 100 experts to conduct a top-to-bottom strategic assessment of US Central Command’s area of responsibility.
Petraeus tapped Col. (P) H.R. McMaster to lead the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, or JSAT, according to multiple sources.
McMaster is widely regarded as one of the Army’s most capable officers. He is the author of Dereliction of Duty, an examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s performance during the Vietnam War, and he commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in western Iraq, a deployment that came to be seen as a model of how to conduct counterinsurgency at the local level.
The team will include people from government, the military and academia.
Petraeus takes charge at CentCom on Oct. 31 and the JSAT will begin its work immediately thereafter.
Sources said the work would likely be completed in February.
General Petraeus, along with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, utilized a JSAT in 2007 that contributed much to the creation of the classified Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq. Among other recommendations the JSAT provided the framework for a new population-centric counterinsurgency strategy intended to provide a bridge for the Iraqi government and security forces to eventual handover of day to day political and security functions.
Michael Gordon of the New York Times and Ann Scott Tyson of the Washington Post reported on JSAT efforts in US Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least ’09 and New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics, respectively.
The overarching aim of the plan, which sets goals for the end of this year and the end of 2008, is more political than military: to negotiate settlements between warring factions in Iraq from the national level down to the local level. In essence, it is as much about the political deals needed to defuse a civil war as about the military operations aimed at quelling a complex insurgency, said officials with knowledge of the plan.
The groundwork for the campaign plan was laid out in an assessment formulated by Petraeus’s senior counterinsurgency adviser, David J. Kilcullen, with about 20 military officers, State Department officials and other experts in Baghdad known as the Joint Strategic Assessment Team. Their report, finished last month, was approved by Petraeus and Crocker as the basis of a formal campaign plan that will assign specific tasks for military commands and civilian agencies in Iraq.
The plan anticipates keeping US troop levels elevated into next year but also intends to significantly increase the size of the 144,000-strong Iraqi army, considered one of the more reliable institutions in the country and without which a US withdrawal would spell chaos. “You will have to do something about the sucking noise when we leave,” said a US officer familiar with the plan.
The plan has three pillars to be carried out simultaneously — in contrast to the prior sequential strategy of “clear, hold and build.” One shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi security forces — the primary focus under the former top US commander, Gen. George W. Casey Jr. — toward protecting Iraq’s population in trouble areas, a central objective of the troop increase that President Bush announced in January.
“The revised counterinsurgency approach we’re taking now really focuses on protecting those people 24/7 . . . and that competent non-sectarian institutions take the baton from us,” said Kilcullen, offering an overview of the campaign plan.
With mounting pressure to “get Afghanistan under control” and many pundits and politicians advocating an Iraq-like “surge” of US and NATO troops into that country the formation of a Central Command JSAT is very good news. A critical counterinsurgency lesson learned (and at times unlearned) is one size does not fit all and while a new strategy may include a substantial increase in ground combat forces circumstances warrant a comprehensive approach based on factors peculiar to Afghanistan.
Moreover, JSAT recommendations for Afghanistan must be an integral part of a regional strategy that includes Pakistan and India – as Dr. T.X. Hammes rightly argues in his recent Small Wars Journal blog post – The Good War?
Even worse, to date, the candidates are discussing only Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan or India. Yet both these Southwest Asian nations are much more critical to the United States future than Afghanistan. Neither candidate has questioned the wisdom of bombing, and likely destabilizing Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of almost 170 million people, in order to help our security efforts in Afghanistan. Nor has there been a discussion whether dedicating more resources to Afghanistan is more effective than dedicating different but equivalent resources to support Pakistan. This is despite the fact that 80% of the supplies for the forces we have in Afghanistan come by road directly through one of the least stable parts of Pakistan. In short, if Pakistan destabilizes we probably lose in Afghanistan – the converse is not true.
Yet, our position in Afghanistan appears to be largely shaping our policy toward Pakistan. And our actions in Pakistan inevitably have a major impact on our relationship with India — a rising nation destined to be the most important of the three.
We entered Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda’s operating forces and eliminate its training bases. We successfully eliminated the bases and hurt Al Qaeda badly. One reason often given for our presence in Afghanistan is that we must stabilize it as a nation so that Al Qaeda can never use it as a terrorist base again. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda has moved its forces and its bases into Pakistan. The subsequent conflict inside Pakistan is contributing to increasing instability in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and has greatly increased the strain on the Pakistani government.
Before we rush more troops into Afghanistan, we must answer basic questions about our strategy for the region and how our efforts in Afghanistan support that strategy. Good tactics and more troops are not a substitute for a strategy – and in fact can significantly raise the cost of a bad strategy.
While not mentioned by T.X., Iran shares a border and long history with Afghanistan and if recent reporting holds true is increasingly taking an active role in supporting the Taliban.
For additional background on the Iraq JSAT and the issues facing decision-makers in 2007 see The New Yorker’s The General’s Dilemma by Steve Coll, Newsweek Magazine’s Brainiac Brigade by Babak Dehghanpisheh and John Barry, and Dave Kilcullen’s posts here at Small Wars Journal (scroll down to 2007 entries).
Well said.
“… the tragic breakup of multinational states”
Russian nationalist code for ” The Soviet Union” – the loss of which was no tragedy, but rather a triumph for everyone, including the Russian people.
That the Russians squandered their opportunity to become a normal country with an orgy of elite looting is blame that squarely belongs on themselves – however cynically the Clinton administration exploited their downward spiral to let looted funds wash into American banks. As someone who has long believed that the US has had a dysfunctional policy toward Russia it is depressing to see that the Russian nomenklatura remain consumed with shifting the blame for their historical misfortunes, 98% of which are the result of their own bad policies and a legacy of totalitarian and autocratic leadership.
Zen : it’s always easier to find someone to BLAME then to reflect on our own mistakes. Regardless whether it’s on an individual basis or even continental states. I’m sure the Peoples of the US put blame on others (Brazilians, Russians, Indians, chinese) for their present predicaments as well?…
Hi YT,
From what I have read, the American people seem to see fairly clearly that the financial industry has brought this crisis about by greedily overleveraging bad paper and now would like a $ 700 b handout from Washington. I don’t see anyone complaining about Brazil, do you ?
The financial sector is just part of the problem.
The population itself has consumed more than earned for many years, that’s the basis for the crash.
The banks merely exploited this failure.
Zen : guess not. My apologies for over – ASSumin’ peoples’ thoughts. Question is where are they gonna get that 700 billion (how many 0s is that?) from? The Japs & chinese?
G. von SO : rightly so. I’m suprised people could SPEND so much without a care or thought for the future… Then again, it’s becoming a common occurance even in other “free” nations. Phenomena coming soon to “communist” china as well. “Let’s all live like the westerners & buy those big, beautiful SUVs!”, says them.
Great question.
Well my first assumption is that the “$ 700 billion” (actually more but it can be a variable) is nonexistent only in terms of current tax schedules and borrowing sources.
What is readily available and easy to tap ? Two options come to mind ( this is an analysis, not an endorsement):
First is Chinese dollar reserves. The Chinese are heavily dependent on exports to the US to maintain high rates of growth in 7-9% GDP range and political stability ( Wal-Mart by itself is China’s #4 trading partner). Our crash is inevitably their crash because they put all of their eggs in the dollar to hedge against their own domestic economic irrationalities. Beijing will want terms but they have a vital interest in restabilizing the dollar-based global financial system to extend money.
Secondly, the fastest way to change the horrible long-term USG balance sheet and preserve our credit rating is to raise SS/Medicare taxes in terms rate and % of income that is taxable and delay out-year retirement for Gen X. I would also expect finance lobbyists to push the USG and the states to creatively loot public pension funds and perhaps private ones as well. Naturally, there will be some kind of “decent interval” as to try to prevent the public from linking this to the bailout plan.
ljhs : thanks a lot for the economics lesson.
I want to think all you guys for the great input on that piece. I have learned a lot from your input.
Don
Btw, I’ve been in many forum discussions on foreign policy, military policy and the like.
I believe that the Europeans don’t actually want to dominate the world, nor do the Commonwealth states. It’s probably really just the USA (and even for the USA, we could argue about the extent of desired domination).
Europeans want to dominate Europe west of the former USSR & they want to see North Africa and Eastern Europe calm.
The French have additional interests in some Black African countries (stabilize their governments mostly).
The British tend to meddle in global history together with the U.S. Americans, but I don’t see a clear, global interests concept behind their behavior.
South Asian, South-East Asian, Latin American and East Asian affairs get very little attention in Europe (except the English-speaking countries in UK and French-speaking countries in France).
I’ve seen no indication of any European interest in preparing for the defense of Taiwan against the PRC or containing the PRC, for example. The same goes for South Korea. It’s simply no topic.
“Wal-Mart by itself is China’s #4 trading partner”
Made that point many times myself.
Walmart is also the largest EMPLOYER outside
of US Government and Military interests in
North America.
http://tinyurl.com/4ggqs6
Yet in the bowls of the Pentagon are many who pine
and openly advocate for war with China, over Taiwan.
This attitude to my mind underscores the idiocy
of the current mindset in America, as evidenced by the current crisis.
It’s also sadly apparent that America will have to sink lower,
much lower, ever lower, before it gives up on it’s delusional dreams of world control and domination.
Apart from al that though, we’re handling things really well and are doing just great.
M
I’ll add in haist that the American propensity for hedgemony by the time it boils down, from the elites, and is sold to the average “schmuck” is driven largely by emotions and patriotic fervor.
This precludes any possibility of clear rational thought.
Boyd himself I’m confident would agree, that emotions as such should not dominate reaction ans decision making.
MaX
In somewhat of a defense of the West and of the United States, there is a widespread aspiration particularly amongst Americans to be author of one’s own fate, captain of one’s own ship, lord of one’s own castle.
This is sort of an extreme free will position in response to the fate vs. free will conundrum.
Unfortunately, despite one’s aspiration for subjective free will, there nevertheless are objective constraints. Should these constraints multiply or become more difficult, one responds by lashing out. To secure one’s free will; rather than overcoming these constraints; one projects these constraints upon others.
This gives rise to imperialism, domination, and the like. And describes much of the behavior that we have witnessed in Bush’s America.
[i]many who pine
and openly advocate for war with China, over Taiwan.[/i]
Speaking from Taiwan, it’s currently a good place to do business precisely because Beijing doesn’t have much direct power over it.
If Beijing had as much power over Taiwan as Beijing has over Hong Kong, Taiwan would probably be a much worse place to do business.
So those plotters in the bowels of the Pentagon are wise not to trust Beijing, however foolish they may be in other respects.
“So those plotters in the bowels of the Pentagon are wise not to trust Beijing, however foolish they may be in other respects.
Sure, and if YOU say so, no argument there.
As we do not trust, nor particuarly “like” the regiems of N. Korea, Myranmar, or Russia, IraN, Syria, Pakistan, Venusella, Cuba, etc, (the list is virtually endless).
Just as in interaction with a thousdand pepole, one might discover scores that you might not particaurly care for personely.
Yet, for thier part, and where the bottom line is about all that matters these days, Walmart Inc. the worlds largest commercial retail operation has done just fine in their dealings with mainland China.
And the moral of the story, and pay attention now friends,
“You don’t have to particaurly like someone, nor a regiem,
to sucessfully and to enjoy considerable mutual profit, in doing bussiness with them.”
And that friends beats the heck out of going to war.
There endeth the lesson.
Questions ?
MaX