Don Vandergriff

Winslow Wheeler–Failures of Intellect and Ethics An Air Force on Free Fall

don — Wed, 23 Jul 2008 16:11:05 +0000

Winslow is another leader of our nation. He is hard hitting, intelligent and a leader that cares a lot about the declining condition of our nation. Importantly, he also provides solutions to the problems he points out. I am blessed to be his friend and to learn from him over the years. I first met him when he was a staffer with the Senate, and he had me over to brief other staffers on the U.S. officer corps (as part of my work on Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs). Since his retirement, Winslow is the director of the Straus Reform Project located at the Center of Defense Information (CDI). Unlike most other think tanks, Win (as he is called) tells it like it is much to the dislike of the defense and political establishment. But, Win does not do his analysis on pure gut feelings; he uses thorough analysis of budgets and decisions to hand over his verdicts. Winslow is another leader this country needs right now, but due to “American Exceptionalism,” all but ignores. Please read the following essay that looks at the ethical demise of a large organization that in fact espouses high ethical performance. This comes about when the rhetoric becomes the truth in the ears of its leaders and power corrupts. It is because the entire Air Force is led by “cheerleaders,” where preserving the status quo (the money) is more important than its original values system.

COUNTERPUNCH.COM
July 23, 2008

Failures of Intellect and Ethics
An Air Force in Free Fall
By WINSLOW T. WHEELER

Recently, at Maxwell Air Force Base, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates admonished his Air Force audience to adapt better to the changed circumstances of war in the 21st century. Six weeks later, he fired its two most senior leaders, the Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff T. Michael Moseley. Then on June 18, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) told the Air Force its selection process for a new air refueling tanker aircraft was so deeply flawed it should start the process all over again - for the third time.

Ostensibly, these events were about technology: using more unmanned aerial drones (how most press interpreted the speech at Maxwell), mishandling nuclear weapon components (the stated reasons for firing Secretary Wynne and General Moseley), and what air refueling tanker better meets the Air Force’s hardware needs. However, to see the underlying issues as technological is to misunderstand the crossroads the Air Force has come to.

The epitome of the Air Force’s self-image is the F-22 fighter. At $355 million for each of the 184 purchased, it is history’s most expensive fighter aircraft, but it is yet to fly its first sortie in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it likely never will. As an air-to-air fighter, it is irrelevant to those conflicts. It may even be a gigantic flop against the non-existent major conventional air force it is designed to fight: too few are affordable to deal with such a foe; it is an aerodynamic performer that on close inspection is a huge disappointment; and it relies on a radar-based “beyond visual range” air-to-air combat hypothesis that has failed time and time again to deliver meaningfully effective results in real air combat.

However, the shadow over the Air Force is darker than arguments over its technology. Despite the F-22’s irrelevance to real world wars, the Air Force’s leadership dedicated virtually the entire institution to advocating more of them than the Pentagon was willing to buy. Unauthorized Air Force lobbying for more F-22s had become so commonplace on Capitol Hill and in oblique (and not-so-oblique) comments to the press that it was clear the Air Force saw the Pentagon’s (and the President’s) budget as just the starting point for grabbing more dollars.

The Air Force engaged in equally extracurricular, behind-the-back cheerleading for C-17 cargo aircraft. Despite its non-optimal range, payload and size for either intercontinental or intra-theater transport, the Air Force blatantly winked, nodded and cheered as Congress bought C-17s above and beyond what Secretary Gates had approved.

Despite being the least involved American military service in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air Force has been seeking the biggest of all unauthorized supplements to its already historically huge annual budget. Shortly before he was fired, Moseley submitted a list of “unfunded requirements” (better known as his “wish list”) to complement the $143.7 billion budget he was authorized to support by the Pentagon. At $18.7 billion, the Air Force’s “wish list” was more than twice the size of the Navy’s ($7 billion), and it was more than four times the size of the war-engaged Army’s ($3.9 billion).

Each of the military services deem themselves free of any pretense of restraint by budgets approved by the president and secretary of defense, but the Air Force has put itself in a category all its own for its unbridled lust for extracurricular money.

Nowhere has the Air Force’s sense of self-entitlement been more obvious than in the unending scandals surrounding the acquisition of new air refueling tankers. Its 2001 plan to “lease-purchase” Boeing 767 airliners as tankers at costs well above the price of just purchasing them came to a demise only after Sen. John McCain. R-Ariz., and the Justice Department found an Air Force official colluding with a Boeing corporate manager (both were subsequently jailed). With that grimy background and the world watching, one would have expected the Air Force acquisition process to be on its best behavior when it re-started its tanker acquisition. It did so - properly at first - with a solicitation for competing bids from Boeing and Northrop-Grumman-Airbus. Despite voluminous assurances from the top of the Air Force - and the Pentagon - that the competition was fought and won fair and square, the GAO’s June 18 report was extraordinarily strongly worded, ruling that the Air Force contract award process was in fact heavily biased, this time in favor of Northrop-Grumman.

These are not technical, or even technological, flaws. They are instead failures of intellect and - much more importantly - ethics. Secretary Gates has done the right thing by calling the Air Force leadership into account. However, it is very unclear how far he is willing to go to explain his firings and to fix what that is really wrong. This is especially apparent in his decision to permit the Air Force to try again on the tanker contract - supervised only by the same top Pentagon officials who - supposedly - supervised the process last year. Instead, the time has come to make a constructive example of the Air Force and to take the tanker contract award decision out of its hands entirely. Instead, give it to a special panel, appointed by the Secretary of Defense, consisting of military - not just Air Force - and civilian people who have committed not to accept any future relationship with Boeing, Northrop-Grumman-EADS, or their major suppliers. That new dawn is long overdue.

Looking at the individuals Secretary Gates has nominated to lead the Air Force now, they come from backgrounds that offer some hypothetical hope. Gen. Norton Schwartz will, if confirmed by the Senate, be the service’s first-ever chief of staff to come from something other than the service’s fighter or bomber bureaucracies. He does, however, come from the Transport Command, where under-the-table lobbying for those C-17s has been rife. The new secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley, has an accounting background, but as the Air Force comptroller, he did not clean out the Augean stables of the service’s financial non-accountability, which continues to this day.

In his speech at Maxwell Air Force Base, Secretary Gates described the abiding ethic of American military reformer and strategist Col. John R. Boyd, whose legacy includes the F-15 and F-16 fighters and, more importantly, a new way of thinking about human conflict. Among many things, Boyd taught that the moral choices one makes are what really determines who wins and who loses. As Gates put it - accurately - Boyd said you can choose “to be” somebody - to become a member of the club but also to make crippling moral compromises. Or, you can choose “to do,” that is to sacrifice personal and bureaucratic interests in favor of actions that address the real needs of the nation and the Air Force, even - nay, especially - when almost no one else sees it that way.

Gates summarized Boyd in saying, “In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you have to make a decision: to be or to do.”

The Air Force came - reluctantly but ultimately completely - to embrace the aircraft Boyd gave it, but the service ignored his broader teaching. Now, the Air Force is reaping the consequences. It remains very unclear if the Air Force now has the leadership that Col. Boyd and his work epitomized, or whether it will just be a matter of time before the service’s new leadership presides over yet another embarrassment that comes from its long term focus on being, not doing.

It is not time that will tell; time is too short, to act is the thing.

Winslow T. Wheeler spent 31 years working on Capitol Hill with senators from both political parties and the Government Accountability Office, specializing in national security affairs. Currently, he directs the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information in Washington and is author of The Wastrels of Defense.

Baldoni Interview of Vandergriff on Harvard Business Publishing

don — Mon, 21 Jul 2008 14:07:23 +0000

John Baldoni interviewed me recently regarding the acceptance of my leadership model called Adaptive Leader Methodology (ALM) by the U.S. Army (ALM is outlined in Chapter 3 of my book Raising the Bar as Adaptive Course Model ACM (U.S. Army did not like that name)). John is a friend and a leadership consultant, coach, and speaker. His work centers on how leaders can use their authority, communications and presence to build trust and drive results. He is the author of six books on leadership, including How Great Leaders Get Great Results (which I highly recommend). In 2007 John was named one of the world’s top 30 leadership gurus by Leadership Gurus International. For more on John and his work, visit www.johnbaldoni.com

A Methodology for Leading Into the Unknown

Chuck Spinney on Obama’s Politics of Change: Afghanistan & Gore’s Transformative Vision…

don — Fri, 18 Jul 2008 14:38:37 +0000

The following short essay is from my good friend and mentor Mr. Chuck Spinney. One of the greatest people this country has produced. He has the absolute strength of character and moral courage every leader should strive for. Chuck talks about strategy and politics, or how we keep getting our strategy wrong, despite a capital beltway filled with incredible resumes and very smart people.

But, our society has not learned yet, that resumes may look good, as well as the person hiding behind them; but it is strength of character that makes a leader. Strength of character is the ability to, even the fondness for seeking responsibility, and then having the moral courage to make and stand by decisions in the face of your peers, subordinates, superiors and foes. Today, we see everyone declaring they are agents of change to get the support they need. The irony is, when one peers behind the curtains, they are being advised by the same people that got us into all the debacles we are dealing with today. It is funny how these leaders (a weak term at best, and one I use sparingly) advocate change, but refuse to get advice from all the people that the establishment labels as radicals or heretics. There are some fools out there, but I know many good citizens and leaders that have the moral courage to advocate change based on well documented and thoroughly thought out research.

One area that Chuck and I disagree is the need to radically move to alternative energy sources. Yes, I agree with him that it is going to be hard, but it has to be done. But, I think we disagree to agree. What may make it impossible, is the fact that “We the People” are not willing to elect (the obligation the Constitution says we have in our part in government) the right type of hard-ass and smart leaders to move us in the right direction. Yes, both of the major parties gave us their best, which is not much at all; but, we could look at other candidates (look at Ron Paul, how much money he raised, and he also won the first debate last May hands down).

Anyway, I have a little hope, but not much. I think we have the will and ability to make the massive change to alternative energies, but we have to overcome and replace entire layers of self-serving politicians and bureaucrats that proclaim change, but in reality do little. And of course, “We the People,” are guilty because we keep putting the same people back in power, based on their continual proclamations to keep the way we live going, with little cost in terms of sacrifice (why we have one of the greatest financal crisis going now). Finally, we then all go out and complain about these people (look at the lowest ratings of any Congress ever is the one we have today, but I will bet you most of those Congressmen and Senators keep their jobs after the next elections).

I look forward toward your comments from the articles below, beginning with Chuck’s analysis.

Obama’s Politics of Change:

Afghanistan & Gore’s Transformative Vision

I am in almost complete agreement with Tom Hayden’s article in the Nation [or see Attachment 1 below] criticizing Obama inter aliafor jumping on the “good war” bandwagon by proposing to transfer troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. Hayden’s essay is a very good article in my opinion … lots of useful information, thanx.

Afghanistan, like Iraq, is a real loser. But this should come as no surprise. In the fall of 2001, intel reports said there were between 40-60,000 Taliban, but when we quickly “defeated” them, the intel folks could only account for 6-8000 captured, wounded or killed. Nevertheless, the Pentagon brass and Bush quickly declared victory, even though it was clear at the time that the Taliban headed for the hills in classical guerrilla/Sun Tzufashion — when faced with superior force, disperse! That’s a no-brainerin some circles but not those inside the Beltway. Now we are saying the Taliban are “regrouping” when is not clear they ever degrouped. BTW, at the time, I tried to draw attention to this withsome mainstream reporters but all they wanted to write about were reports parroting Pentagon press releases which described the stunning success of hi-technology precision weapons + Special Forces on horseback executing a swift low cost victory, which was being spouted as a vindication of Transformation — aka the Revolution in Military Affairs.

It is also is important to bear in mind that no Pashtunswere involved in 9-11 … at most, the Taliban were accessories to a monstrous crime — a crime that should have be used to energize a massive world-widepolice action. Such an internationalpolice action led by the United States might have been possible, given the worldwide flood of sympathy for the US provoked by bin Laden’s outrageous mass murder. We will never know if this was a real possibility, because Bush chose to immediately militarize the bin-Laden problem then mutate into the open-ended so-called Global War on Terror, and use bin Laden as a propaganda prop to make war on a country that was at most an accessory to the crime, i.e., the Taliban in Afghanistan, and on a leader and country that was not involved in 9-11 at all, i.e., Saddam and Iraq.

Ironically, in the case of Afghanistan, there is evidence suggesting that bin Laden et alhad worn out their welcome with the Taleban. Four months before9-11, on June 18, 2001, Arnaud de Borschgravewrote a very important front page story in the Washington Times describing his interview with the Taliban leader Mullah Omar . De Borshgravequoted Omar making some disparaging comments that suggested he was fed up with Osama [see Attachment 2 below]. Much later, in January 2008, John Pilger described a reinforcing view in report published in Antiwar.com which included the following passage:

“By early 2001, convinced it was the presence of OsamaBin Laden that was souring their relationship with Washington, the Taliban tried to get rid of him. Under a deal negotiated by the leaders of Pakistan’s two Islamic parties, Bin Laden was to be held under house arrest in Peshawar. A tribunal of clerics would then hear evidence against him and decide whether to try him or hand him over to the Americans. Whether or not this would have happened, Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf vetoed the plan.According to the then Pakistani foreign minister, Niaz Naik, a senior US diplomat told him on 21 July 2001 that it had been decided to dispense with the Taliban “under a carpet of bombs.”

On Oct 7, 2001, Bush launched the war against the Taliban, after the Taliban refused Bush’s demand to hand over bin Laden withoutany preconditions. On October 14, in an effort to halt the bombing, the Taliban offered to turn over Osamato an independent third country for a trial, if the US would provide evidence that he was responsible for the crime. [see Bush Rejects Taliban Bin Laden Offer," Associated Press, October 14, 2005, “Bush Rejects Taliban Offer to Hand bin Laden Over,” UK Guardian Unlimited, October 14, 2001 and Andrew Buncombe, “Bush Rejects Taliban Offer to Surrender bin Laden,” the UK Independent, October 15, 2001. ]. But Bush ignored this offer and escalated the war. Today, almost seven years later, bin Laden remains at large, the Taliban are growing stronger, and Afghanistan is threatening to consume more US blood and gold as it sinks into a deepening quagmire which is spilling over into nuclear armed Pakistan.

So, even the most jaded observer has to admit that it is possiblethat Taliban were hunting for an escape hatch, even though a strict adherence to their moral code of hospitality made them responsible for Osama’sdefense, once we attacked him in their homeland. Osama may also have madea brilliant preemptive move to fend off the possibility of a Taliban handover. On Sept 9, he is believed to have engineered the assassination of Ahmed Massood. Massood, the charismatic albeit brutal Tajik leader of the Northern Alliance, was the Taliban’s most bitter and capable enemy within Afghanistan. Under the strict Pashtun tribal code, that assassination madethe Taliban indebted to bin Laden, particularly if he was seeking sanctuary (if indeed it was bin Laden who had orchestrated the assassination). Nevertheless the Taliban still offered to turn him over for trialby an impartial third party, if the United States provided evidence of Osama’scomplicity in 9-11. The story of bin Laden’s deteriorating relationship with Taliban in the spring and summer of 2001 is one that has not really been fully developed, but there is enough smoke to warrant a serious investigation, especially if we are on the verge of escalating operations in Afghanistan. One thing is clear, however. Capturing Osama bin Ladintook a back seat to prosecuting the wars with Iraq and the Taliban.

Now, we see Obama and Dems rushing into the deepening Afghan quagmire. They are trying to pit a “good” Afghan war against a “bad” Iraqi war to prove they are just as “tough” on defense as the Republicans, only smarter. But this is the old pusillanimous ploy of moving to middle to capture independents in an election year. The next move Obama is likely to take, if Obama’s advisors like former Senator Sam Nunn and andformer Clinton Defense Secretary William Perry have any clout, will be a call to reform of acquisition management in Pentagon while we recapitalize the Pentagon’s aging weapons with a shopping list of even more complex andexpensive “precision” weapons. They will package this reform program in rhetoric asserting the need to increase the defense budget further in order to repair the damage Bush did to military!!!!!! That shore up the right flank and quiet the Pentagon and its allies in Congress and in the defense industry.

It does not matter that the weapons aging crisis is a self-inflicted wound has been hemorrhaging for 40 years and is a direct conseqence of the bipartisan predilection (especially including that of Nunn and Perry when they were in power) for buying hi-cost weapons that do not work as well as advertised. It does not matter that this predilection has caused an out-of-control operations and maintenance budget, wherein the operating costs of increasingly complex, aging weapons have gone through the roof. It does not matter that the Pentagon’s bookkeeping system is now so corrupt that it is impossible to relate the money that goes in to Pentagon to how that money is spent or what it has produced, a condition of ambiguity which itself is useful because it lubricates the incestuously amplifying decision-making process that is powering the self-destructive predilection for hi-tech weapons that don’t work as advertised. The likelihood of such an appeal for higher budgets is now almost as probable in its effects as a cause and effect relationship in Newtonian physics.

Meanwhile, to make matters even worse, Obama just knee-jerked and endorsed Gore’s absurd call to end US dependency on carbon for electrical power (i.e., coal, oil, gas) in 10 years by throwing money at the renewable energy programs in a crash program patterned after John F. Kennedy’s Apollo program in the so-called Moon race — which, by the way, is a ridiculous analogy. Going to the moon was a far simpler, far more narrow, engineering problem which involved only a comparatively miniscule investment in production/infrastructure facilities. Repoweringall the carbon-fired power plants withsolar, wind, and water generators in the United States would be a gargantuan effort requiring development of new technologies, particularly energy storage technologies, and massive investments in all sorts of infrastructure. The only near term energy technology that could be used on such a massive scale is nuclear power, and even that would be impossible to do in ten years, particularly given the problems of storing radioactive waste, location, and safety. Bear in mindthat Gore’s colossal feat would take place in a country that can not muster the political will to solve the comparatively simple problem of rebuilding New Orleans.

Of course, Gore packaged his transformative vision under the umbrella of national security (the politics of fear, again) Gore’s proposal, if it ever gets traction, will result in a colossal boondoggle for same hi-tech companies that now take 20+ years to move an airplane like F-22 or a weapon system that doesn’t work like missile defense from R&D to anything like operational status.

Now I am all for developing solar and wind technologies, etc, but a transformation of the nation’s entire electrical production capabilities in 10 years is preposterous on its face.

Gore’s top-down (I know what is best) proposal, which Obama (who claims to be a bottom-up politician) endorsed, is really a formula for looting the taxpayer, particularly when you consider that the techno-defense giants, like Boeing & Lockheed, are certain cash in on the Gore’s golden cornucopia, should it occur. The horrors of the ethanol scam will be welcome by comparison.

Surely, high speed rail, mandating better fuel economy in cars, subsidizing more insulation in houses and office buildings, wearing sweaters, subsidizing population movements from suburbs to cities, and other proven technologies would yield far larger energy benefits in the short term.

And, oh by the way, in case Gore and Obama have not noticed in the rush to a “good war” and universalgreen power … there may be a slight problem with raising the money needed to implement Gore’s Bush-like transformative vision: the economy is tanking, government and private debt are skyrocketing (more and more of which is being held by foreign countiries), socialspending demands are increasing because baby boomers are moving into social security andmedicare, the financial system may be collapsing, and the nation’s physical infrastructure is deteriorating rapidly (roads, sewers, bridges, schools, etc.), not to mention the fact that US’sproduction/technicalcapabilities have been going down the tubes, as is evidenced by the persistence of huge trade imbalances and the fact that production facilities that have been moving overseas.

But then you shouldn’t condemn an entire program for a few little slip ups.

Chuck Spinney

aboard S/V Chaliventures, lying Finike, Turkey

———–[Attachment 1]————-

The Nation

Oama, Iraq and Afghanistan

by TOM HAYDEN

July 15, 2008

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080721/hayden3

Sen. Obama listens to his introduction before making a foreign policy speech on Iraq in Washington.

Any proposal to transfer American troops from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan is sure to cause debate and questions among peace activists and rank-and-file Democrats. The proposal potentially represents a wider quagmire for the US government and military.

On Iraq, Obama said nothing especially new in his July 14 New York Times op-ed piece andhis foreign policy speech in Washington today. In both, he forcefully restated his commitment to combat troop withdrawals after his recent statements suggesting that he would “refine” his views when he consults military commanders on the ground. He neglected to address how many American “residualforces” he would leave behind in Iraq to fight Al Qaeda and “protect American service members,” though he made additional US trainers conditional on the Iraqis making “politicalprogress.” It is a proposal that seems to promise a phased diminishing of the American military presence, not a complete withdrawal.

Many independent analysts question the wisdom of leaving some 50,000 American troops as advisers, trainers and counter-terrorism units in Iraq after the withdrawal of 140,000 by 2010. Those forces would be protecting a sectarian political regime that is linked to death squads, militias and a detention system now holding 50,000 Iraqis in violation of human rights standards.

It is quite possible that Obama’s regionaldiplomacy, including hard bargaining withIran, could facilitate a decent interval for American troop withdrawals and a more stabilized Iraq, as suggested by former CIA director John M. Deutch.

Obama smartly exploited the recent call by Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki for a US withdrawal deadline, although al-Maliki’s timelinewas twice as long as Obama’s. In this face-saving scenario, the Pentagon would follow “the Philippine option,” in which the client government formally requested that the United States close its bases. This option was advocated openly by the Marines’ commander in Iraq in 2004. The United States withdrew only obsolete navalforces from the Philippines, however; today we spendhundreds of millions on a secret war against Islamic forces in the southern Philippines. Obama might do the same.

These public policy ambiguities are not simply Obama’s problem; they are caused by a mainstream media that stubbornly refuses to ask any questions about those “residual forces.” For example, how will “residual forces,” tied to the regime the Americans put in power, be more successful on the battlefield than the departing 170,000 combat troops?

But Obama’s proposals for Afghanistan and Pakistan are far more problematic. They can be described in everyday language as either out of the frying pan and into the fire or attacking needles by burning down haystacks.

The Pentagon paradigm is to defeat Al Qaeda militarily while refusing to address, and thereby worsening, the dire conditions that gave rise to the Taliban and Al Qaedaoperatives in the first place. In careful prose based on reputable sources, Ahmed Rashid’s new Descent into Chaos (Viking, 2008) provides a horrific portrait of Afghanistan:

• It is estimated by RAND that $100 per capita is the minimum required to stabilize a country evolving out of war. Bosnia received $679 per capita, Kosovo $526, while Afghanistan received $57 per capita in the key years, 2001-2003.

• When the United States installed the Hamid Karzai government, Afghanistan ranked 172nd out of 178 nations on the United Nation’s Human Development Index. It has the highest rate of infant mortality in the world, a life expectancy rate of 44-45 years, and the youngest population of any country. In 2005, 95 percent of Kabul’s residents were living without electrical power.

• Seven hundred civilians were killed in the first five months of 2008 alone, according to the United Nations.

• Despite some gains in media and currency reform, plus a modest increase in the number of children in school, this was the path of least reconstruction. And despite images of Afghan democracy that made loya jirga tribalgatherings appear to be the birth of participatory democracy, a warlord state was entrenched by the CIA.

There are some 36,000 US troops stretched across Afghanistan, another 17,500 under NATO command, and 18,000 in counterinsurgency andtraining roles. They are so aggressively combat-oriented that the Afghan government itself continually objects to the rate of civilian casualties. It costs the Pentagon $2 billion per month to support 30,000 American troops. According to Rashid, “Afghanistan is not going to be able to pay for its own army for many years to come–perhaps never.”

As of 2006, Afghanistan’s economy still rested on producing 90 percent of the world’s opium, an eerie narco-state parallel with the US counterinsurgency in Colombia, where most of America’s supply of cocaine originates.

Afghanistan is an unstable police state. By 2005, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission cited 800 cases of detainee abuse at some thirty US firebases. “The CIA operates its own secretdetention centers, which were off limits to the US military.” Ghost prisoners, known as Persons Under Control are held permanently without any public records of their existence. Warlords operate their own prisons with “unprecedented abuse, torture, and death of Taliban prisoners.” And as the US lowered the number of prisoners at Guantánamo, it increased the numbers held at Bagram, near Kabul. As of January, 2008, there were 630 incarcerated at Bagram, “including some who had been there for five years and whom the ICRC had still not been given access to.” After weeks of hunger strikes about detention conditions, the Taliban recently orchestrated a jailbreak of hundreds of Afghanisfrom the Kandahar prison, an inside job.

As in Iraq, the US contracted for police training in Afghanistan with DynCorp International. Between 2003 and 2005, the US spent $860 million to train 40,000 Afghan police, “but the results were totally useless,” according to Rashid. Even Richard Holbrooke described the DynCorp training program as “an appalling joke…a complete shambles.”

When the Taliban government was overthrown, the US installed a Westernized Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, a former lobbyist for Unocal, who had been out of the country during the jihad against the Soviet Union. But for the first time in 300 years, the Pashtun tribes themselves were violently displaced from power. At 42 percent of the population, they remain by far the largest Afghan minority, heavily concentrated in Kandahar and the southern provinces andacross the federally administered tribal areas in western Pakistan. These are the areas that the Pentagon, the New York Times and Barack Obama(like John Kerry before him) designate as the central battlefront of the war on terrorism.

The question is not simply a moral one. Is an expanded war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, fueled by troop transfers from Iraq, winnable? In what sense?

Transferring 10,000 American troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, which Obamaproposes, is symbolic, a potential down payment on the treadmill of further escalation. (In his statement, Obama supports “at least” two additionalbrigades for Afghanistan.) The future of the Pentagon’s “rear” in Iraq will be questionable if fifteen combat brigades are withdrawn under Obama’s plan, while the Pentagon’s new “front” line cannot be secured with two brigades sent to southern and eastern Afghanistan. At best these might be holding actions until the next administration makes a decision about its ultimate strategy. Obama may be proposing an escalation simply in order not to lose, a pattern well-documented in Daniel Ellsberg’s history of the Vietnam War.

But the US escalation policy already is deepening, withbipartisan support–or silence–so far. In keeping withcounterinsurgency strategies going back to America’s long wars against native tribes, the Pentagon has fostered the ascension of a new Pakistani general, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, whose background includes training at Fort Benning andFort Leavenworth. An unnamed US military official praises Kayani “for embracing new counterinsurgency training andtactics that could be more effective in countering militants in the country’s tribalareas. Over $400 million is being spent to recruit a “frontier corps” of to “turn local tribes against militants.” CIA and Special Forces operatives already have invaded Pakistan to setup a secret base from which to hunt Osama bin Laden–before Mr. Bush leaves office–as well as fighting Al Qaeda andthe Taliban on the ground and from pilotless Predator drones.

All this constitutes yet another preventive war by the United States, this one in violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and against the stated policies of the newly elected Pakistani government, not to mention the overwhelming sentiment among Pakistan’s people. On the Afghan front, the Taliban will be able to retreat in the face of greater US firepower, or attack like Lilliputians from multiple sides if the US concentrates its forces around the Pakistan border. Further violence and tides of anti-American sentiment could sweep across the region into Pakistan with unpredictable results.

Michael Scheuer, the former CIA officialonce charged with tracking down Osamabin Laden, suggests that the American delusion is that “by establishing a minority-dominated semi-secular, pro-Indian government [in Kabul], we would neither threaten the identity nor raise the ire of the Pashtun tribes nor endanger Pakistan’s national security.” In his recent book, Marching Towards Hell, Scheuer wrote that “for the United States, the war in Afghanistan has been lost. By failing to recognize that the only achievable US mission in Afghanistan was to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda and their leaders and getout, Washington is now faced with fighting a protracted andgrowing insurgency. The only upside of this coming defeat is that it is a debacle of our own making. We are not being defeated by our enemies; we are in the midst of defeating ourselves.”

The beginning of an alternative may require unfreezing American diplomacy towards Iran andconsidering a “grand bargain” instead. Teheran is the single power, according to CIA director Deutch, that could destabilize the US withdrawal from Iraq. It happens that they were America’s ally against Afghanistan not so long ago. The Iranians have lost thousands of police andsoldiers themselves in a border war against Afghan drug lords. As William Polk wrote in Violent Politics, “ironically, the only effective deterrent to the tradeis Iran.” In exchange for security guarantees against a US-directed regime change, Iran may be willing to discuss cooperation withthe “Great Satan” to stabilize its borders with Iraq and Afghanistan. Improbable? That depends on whether one thinks the alternative is unthinkable.

Only a short time ago, the United States was supporting the jihadistsin the same tribalareas as they ventured to destroy the Soviet occupation. In the same years, the United States was hosting the Taliban for talks on a possible oil pipeline across Afghanistan. Since twists andturns seem to be the only pattern in divide-and-conquer strategies, it is possible that Obama thinks being tough towards Afghanistan and Pakistan is a defensive cover for withdrawing from Iraq, andhe later will follow up with unspecified diplomacy after he takes office. But history shows that creeping escalations create a momentum and constituency of their own. Obama might get lucky, lower the level of the visible wars and embrace a diplomatic offensive. But North and South Waziristan could be his Bay of Pigs.

To borrow a popular phrase of the season, ending one war Iraq to start two more in Afghanistan and Pakistan seems to be a dumb idea.

About Tom Hayden

Tom Hayden is the author of The Other Side(1966, with Staughton Lynd), The Love of Possession Is a Disease With Them (1972), Ending the War in Iraq (2007) and Writings for a Democratic Society: The Tom Hayden Reader (2008).

—-[Attachment 2]——-

Washington Times

June 18, 2001 Pg. 1

Taliban Invalidates Bin Laden’s Orders

By Arnaud de Borchgrave, The Washington Times

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Any holy decree or “fatwa” issued by Osama bin Laden declaring holy war against the United States and ordering Muslims to kill Americans is “null and void,” according to the Taliban´s supreme leader.

Bin Laden, America´s most wanted terror suspect,“is not entitled to issue fatwas as he did not complete the mandatory 12 years of Quranic studies to qualify for the position of mufti,”said Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund, known to every Afghan as amir-ul-mumineen (supreme leader of the faithful).

Mullah Omar made clear that the Islamic Emirate, as the Taliban regime calls itself, would like to “resolve or dissolve” the bin Laden issue. In return, he expects the United States to establish a dialogue that would lead to “an easing and then lifting of U.N. sanctions that are strangling and killing the people of the Emirate.”

The two issues are linked,both in Washington and in Kandahar, the nation´s sprawling, dust-choked religious center of 750,000 people where Mullah Omar and his 10-man ruling Shura, or council, have their headquarters.

Mullah Omar, 41, is a soft-spoken man of very few words. He relies on Rahmatullah Hashimi, a 24-year-old multilingual “ambassador-at-large,” rumored to be Afghanistan´s next foreign minister, to translate and expand his short, staccato statements.

The one-eyed, 6-foot-6-inch, five-times wounded veteran of the war against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s was also the architect of the Taliban´s victory over the multiple warring factions that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.

Sitting cross-legged on the carpeted mud floor of his spartan adobe house on the west end of town, Mullah Omar´s shrapnel-scarred face, topped by a black turban, shows no emotion as he answers in quick succession a military field telephone, walkie-talkies and a wideband radio.

“We´re still fighting a war,” he says impatiently, referring to Ahmed Shah Masood´s guerrilla forces, which still hold 10 percent of Afghan territory in the northeastern part of the country.

According to U.S. intelligence reports, bin Laden has issued instructions that his followers have described as fatwas. But Mullah Omar said, “Only muftis can issue fatwas.” Bin Laden “is not a mufti, and therefore any fatwas he may have issued are illegal and null and void.”

The Afghan supreme leader also said bin Laden is not allowed any contact with the media or with foreign government representatives.

Afghanistan, according to the amir, has suggested to the United States andto the United Nations that international “monitors” keep bin Laden under observation pending a resolution of the case, “but so far we have received no reply.”

Mr. Hashimi, in flawless English, added: “We also notified the United States we were putting bin Laden on trial last September for his alleged crimes and requested that relevant evidence be presented.”

He said the court sat for 40 days, but the United States never presented any evidence of suspected crimes by bin Laden, including his suspected involvement in the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa, which Mullah Omar agreed were “criminal acts.”

“Bin Laden, for his part, swore on the Quranhe had nothing to do with those terrorist bombings and that he is not responsible for what others do who claim to know him,” Mr. Hashimi said.

On Tuesday, a New York court sentenced one Saudi Arabian to life in prison in connection with the embassy bomb attacks; three more men — a Tanzanian, a U.S. citizen and a Jordanian — have also been found guilty and are awaiting sentencing. All claimed to have been acting on orders from bin Laden.

In March,Pakistani leader Gen. Pervez Musharraf told The Washington Times that by demonizing bin Laden, the United States had turned him into a cult figure among Muslim massesand “a hero among Islamist extremists.”

Since then, the State Department has played down the importance of bin Laden. Mullah Omar clearly wishes to do the same. But politically, he cannot afford to deport him lest he arouse the wrath of his fellow extremists.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and theUAE are the only three countries that recognize the Taliban government.Saudi Arabia and the UAEsecretly fund the Taliban by paying Pakistan for its logistical support to Afghanistan.

Mr. Hashemi, a highly intelligent high school dropout who toured the United States earlier this year, fielded other questions that Mullah Omar felt had been answered in recent months:

* On the lack of schools for girls: “We don´t even have enough schools for boys. Everything was destroyed in 20 years of fighting. The sooner U.N. sanctions are lifted, the sooner we can finish building schools for both boys and girls.”

* On the treatment of women: “You forget that America and the rest of the world are centuries ahead of us. If you introduced your manners and mores suddenly in Afghanistan, society would implode and anarchy would ensue. We don´t interfere with what we consider your decadent lifestyle, so please refrain from interfering with ours.”

* On the destruction of TV sets: “Try to imagine what would have happened in 18th- or even 19th-century America or Europe with the overnight introduction of television and all the sex that is now part of programs everywhere except Iran. We are not against television, but against the filth that pollutes the airwaves.”

Bacevich on U.S. Grand Strategy

don — Thu, 17 Jul 2008 12:32:14 +0000

I know Andrew Bacevich. He is a great soldier, gave me an extensive interview for my book, Path to Victory when I was writing it. I also knew a couple of his former troop commanders (he commanded the 11th ACR during and after the First Gulf War). He also lost his son in Iraq two years ago. He just testified before a House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations yesterday. The themes in his remarks are ones he addresses more thoroughly in his forthcoming book, they are the people of the Middle East or the entire Islamic world. To persist in seeing U. S. grand strategy as a project aimed at changing the way they live will be to court bankruptcy and exhaustion. In fact, the choice facing the United States is this one: we can ignore the imperative to change the way we live, in which case we will drown in an ocean of red ink; or we can choose to mend our ways, curbing our profligate inclinations, regaining our freedom of action, and thereby preserving all that we value most. In the end, how we manage, or mismanage, our affairs here at home will prove to be far more decisive than our efforts to manage events beyond our shores, whether in the Persian Gulf or East Asia or elsewhere. The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, which I heartily recommend.

The following testimony on Grand Strategy is excellent, and I could not agree with it more. It amazes me that the so called smart people within Washington D.C. with all their resumes and think tanks, cannot figure this one out. In my opinion, we still have time to salvage and put our nation back on course, but the hard part is that it is going to take smart and tough leaders to do it. As I have said before and before, “where have all the leaders gone?”

His testimony is reproduced below:

Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on the future of U. S. grand strategy to members of this committee.

In American practice, grand strategy almost invariably implies conjuring up a response to emerging threats or prospective challenges beyond our borders. The expectation is that an effective grand strategy will provide a framework for employing American power to shape that external environment shape having in recent years become a favorite term within the community of strategists.

These days inhabitants of that community expend considerable energy (and imagination) devising concepts intended to enable the United States to win the Global War on Terrorism, transform the Greater Middle East, or manage the rise of China.

These are honorable, well-intentioned efforts and may, on occasion, actually yield something useful. After all, the grand strategy of Containment, devised in the wake of World War II, did serve as an important touchstone for policies that enabled the United States and its allies to prevail in the Cold War.

Yet there is a second way to approach questions of grand strategy. This alternative approach, which I will employ in my very brief prepared remarks, is one that emphasizes internal conditions as much as external threats.

Here is my bottom line: the strategic imperative that we confront in our time demands first of all that we put our own house in order. Fixing our own problems should take precedence over fixing the world’s problems.

The past decade has seen a substantial erosion of U. S. power and influence. This has occurred in part as a result of ill-advised and recklessly implemented policy decisions, the Iraq War not least among them. Yet it has also occurred because of our collective unwillingness to confront serious and persistent domestic dysfunction.

The chief expression of this dysfunction takes the form of debt and dependency. In the not so very distant future these may well pose as great a danger to our well-being as violent Islamic radicalism or a China intent on staking its claim to the status of great power.

To persist in neglecting these internal problems is in effect to endorse and perpetuate the further decline in U. S. power.

Let me illustrate the point with two examples.

Example number one is energy. I hardly need remind members of this committee of the relevant facts. Once the world’s number one producer of oil, the United States today possesses a paltry 4% of known global oil reserves while Americans consume one out of every four barrels of worldwide oil production.

President Bush has bemoaned our addiction to foreign oil. He is right to do so. The United States now imports more than 60% of its daily petroleum fix, a figure that will almost surely continue to rise.

The costs of sustaining that addiction are also rising. Since 9/11, the price of oil per barrel has quadrupled. The nation’s annual oil bill now tops $700 billion, much of that wealth helping to sustain corrupt and repressive regimes, some of it subsequently diverted to support Islamic radicals who plot against us.

Since the 1970s, Americans have talked endlessly of the need to address this problem. Talk has not produced effective action.

Instead, by tolerating this growing dependence on foreign oil we have allowed ourselves to be drawn ever more deeply into the Persian Gulf, a tendency that culminated in the ongoing Iraq War. That war, now in its sixth year, is costing us an estimated $3 billion per week–a figure that is effectively a surtax added to the oil bill.

Surely, this is a matter that future historians will find baffling: how a great power could recognize the danger posed by energy dependence and then do so little to avert that danger.

Example number two of our domestic dysfunction is fiscal. Again, you are familiar with the essential problem, namely our persistent refusal to live within our means.

When President Bush took office in 2001, the national debt stood at less than $6 trillion. Since then it has increased by more than 50% to $9.5 trillion. When Ronald Reagan became president back in 1981, total debt equaled 31% of GDP. Today, the debt is closing in on 70% of GDP.

This is no longer money we owe ourselves. Increasingly, we borrow from abroad, with 25% of total debt now in foreign hands. Next to Japan, China has become our leading creditor, a fact that ought to give strategists pause.

Given seemingly permanent trade imbalances, projected increases in entitlement programs, and the continuing costs of fighting multiple, open-ended wars, this borrowing will continue and will do so at an accelerating and alarming rate. Our insatiable penchant for consumption and aversion to saving only exacerbate the problem.

Any serious attempt to chart a grand strategy for the United States will need to address this issue, which cannot be done without considerable sacrifice.

Now there are those who would contend that the Bush administration has already formulated a grand strategy, one that will carry us well into the current century. The centerpiece of this strategy is the Global War on Terrorism, in some quarters referred to as the Long War.

In fact, the Long War represents an impediment to sound grand strategy. To persist in the Long War will be to exacerbate the existing trends toward ever greater debt and dependency and it will do so while placing at risk America’s overstretched armed forces.

To imagine that a reliance on military power can reverse these trends toward ever increasing debt and dependency would be the height of folly. This is the central lesson that we should take away from period since September 11, 2001.

Shortly after 9/11 then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld framed the strategic problem facing the United States this way. “We have a choice,” he said, “either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to change the way that they live; and we chose the latter.”

What we have learned since then is that the United States does not possess the capacity to change the way they live, whether they are the people of the Middle East or the entire Islamic world. To persist in seeing U. S. grand strategy as a project aimed at changing the way they live will be to court bankruptcy and exhaustion.

In fact, the choice facing the United States is this one: we can ignore the imperative to change the way we live, in which case we will drown in an ocean of red ink; or we can choose to mend our ways, curbing our profligate inclinations, regaining our freedom of action, and thereby preserving all that we value most.

In the end, how we manage, or mismanage, our affairs here at home will prove to be far more decisive than our efforts to manage events beyond our shores, whether in the Persian Gulf or East Asia or elsewhere.

1st Announcement for my next book, Military Recruiting: Finding and Preparing Soldiers

don — Wed, 16 Jul 2008 16:50:15 +0000

I received great and numerous responses from my “Culture of Incompetence” posting. So, I will use it as an excuse to post the first announcement for my next book Military Recruiting: Finding and Preparing Future Soldiers (hit this link to get an overview). Military Recruiting: Finding and Preparing Soldiersis due out in late October. I told Praeger more than a year ago when they asked me to do it, that it was not going to be a book of statistics. If they wanted that, then go to the think tank RAND.

No, my book is dealing with what type of Soldier and leader we need to deal with the future of warfare. It also goes beyond that with the type of culture you need to fight 4GW. If the truth hurts, then don’t read it. But, if you want hard hitting solutions to what we need to do, then you might enjoy it. I must admit, that the book is unbiased. The Army is doing some good things in getting its Soldiers and leaders ready for 4GW, but like any large bureaucratic organization belonging to this country, it also has a lot of work to do.

I devote two chapters to the an explaination of 4th Generation Warfare and the theories of John Boyd. I also devote a chapter to our society. This sets the foundation for the other chapters that focus on what transformation really has to be, as well as one on actual recruiting; but I think the hot chapter will be how Soldiers and leaders should be developed called “Training (and Educating) Tomorrow’s Soldiers and Leaders.”

I got some great ideas from guys in the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) that I have the privilege to work with in my day job. I also talk about the evolution of how my own leader development model, called Adaptive Leader Methodology is used and progressing in the Army.

In reference to my recent ”Culture of Incompetence” blog, I have a chapter in my forthcoming book called “U.S. Society’s Impact” which talks about how our society has not set the foundation needed to fill the ranks of our units with good Soldiers and leaders. It is taking a lot of hard work by many good leaders right now to get them as ready as they can be.

On War #267: Running the Narrows…

don — Tue, 15 Jul 2008 18:15:09 +0000

Echoes what I have been saying for years. Of course Bill Lind and I talk alot about the poor health of our nation, and the even worse condition of our leadership. Of course when the American people keep electing cheerleaders with the character of a criminal, what do you expect. “All for one and everyone for me, they keep crying as they take their oaths of office.”

Jul.15.2008
On War #267: Running the Narrows

By William S. Lind
July 15, 2008

The war as in life, the secret to success is having a wide range of options. That was the basis of von Moltke’s approach to operational art, as opposed to the Schlieffen school’s myopic focus on one option. The list of commanders and nations whose single option failed is a long one.

Regrettably, whoever takes over as America’s President and Commander in Chief next January will face a rapidly narrowing range of options. With the fall of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, America was given an almost limitless range of options. A series of bad decisions since that time have reduced that range to a paltry few, none of them particularly attractive. Running the narrows with a ship of state is a perilous enterprise.

William S. Lind: On War #266 Viva Columbia

don — Tue, 15 Jul 2008 12:43:57 +0000

I am proud to say that Bill Lind is a close friend of mine. This is one of his best columns, because it provides a great example of how one side in war gains a moral victory. John Boyd stated that the moral side of war is the strongest. In the following passage, Bill points out that the Colombian Army achieved a big moral victory over the FARC. This is the “how to,” which so many of us are looking for. Everyone spouts theory, the what or the why, but few provide actual examples of the how to. I am always looking for good (or bad) examples of how to apply adaptability and that of being a learning example to current conflicts as well as the business world. Here, Bill provides an answer.The other insight here is the importance of playing the role of the “behind the scenes strength” or the man behind the shadows. As Bill states, he is sure the U.S. had a hand in it, but downplayed its role. It is so important when trying to strengthen an alliance, be it in war or in business, that it appears that the home team won it on its own. That is tough in this day and age, when in our resume filled me first society, it is all about the individual’s advancement for the short-term, vice the advancement of the larger body over the long term.

Jul.14.2008
by dni

On War #266: Viva Colombia!

By William S. Lind
July 14, 2008

The war between the Colombian state and the Marxist FARC is not a Fourth Generation conflict, because it is fought within the framework of the state. The Colombian government seeks to maintain control of the state, while the FARC want to replace it. It’s all about who runs the state, not offering alternatives to the state.

Nonetheless, some lessons for Fourth Generation wars may be drawn, because the way in which the war is fought — a guerilla-style insurgency — similar to many (not all) Fourth Generation conflicts. The recent successful rescue of hostages long held by the FARC is a case in point. It was a brilliant victory for the Colombian government and armed forces, on all levels, including the moral level. What might the U.S. Armed Forces learn from it that they could apply in Iraq, Afghanistan, and (we fear) elsewhere?

A Culture of Incompetence…

don — Mon, 14 Jul 2008 17:57:24 +0000

My Father used to tell me, “do every job well, or not at all.” He also lamented on me with, “Once you start something, don’t quit. You don’t have to be the star, just do the best you can and don’t quit until it is over.”

What happened to our culture’s embodied values that included doing all jobs well, and taking personal pride in a job well done?

Over the weekend, I encountered examples, though small, but when linked together is why our nations seriously needs to reexamine itself if we are to rise again into greatness.

On six occasions I experienced incompetence. Let me please note, that I am easy to get a long with, and I am very tolerable of “honest mistakes.” But, too many of these events occurred in two days for it to be an exception to the rule.

I have felt over the years, due to many social factors that our standards as a nation are going down. I will focus here on standards in our work.

1. I start off my Saturday bright and early, go and workout at my gym, Sport and Health Club, doing “pull” day, then a short swim. After that, I returned to my house, got out with my mountain bike and hit a series of local trails that border either side of two large power cuts that prevent developers from tearing up some good woods and fields these trails crisscross. I have a great ride, and just in time to spend the rest of my day with my wife, Lorraine. We then go and had a good brunch with our sons and grandchildren. After that, my wife asks me to go with her to Macy’s. I hate malls and shopping, but she promises 30 minutes, so I go (plus I needed to walk off the meal I had just had).

My wife lets me wander around, and then we link up at the time we set. She had done well, she was standing in the cashiers line. But, what is the hold up? The guy in front me is making a scene because the cashier’s machine will not process his credit card. So, another person takes us to another checkout (great initiative on their part). We arrive, we slide my wife’s bank card through the little slide machine, and the cashier keeps saying denied, denied. So, he tries to call around to find out the problem. At that point the entire system crashes, it has happened all through the store. Big sell, lots of people, but not prepared for it. I overheard a women telling my wife that another cashier even told her that it was her (the customer’s fault) for having insufficient funds in her account.

The our cashier tells us it will be 30 minutes, so my wife says lets go have a cup of coffee over at IHOP. “Okay” I said, and we went.

2. Then, the second incompetence happens. My wife and I go into IHOP to get coffee and tea. After telling the manager and two waitresses that all we want is coffee and hot tea, no desert, no desert (still they lay the desert menu in front of you). We sit down, order our drinks, and the young waitress brings a cup of coffee, tea with hot water, tea bags, sweetener and a bowl of little creamers. When I went to place some cream in my hot coffee, it immediately showed me that it was spoiled when it curled in the cup. I finally get some creamer that is not spoiled, drink my tea, and we leave to go back to Macy’s to pay for and pick up our goods. When we get back there, everything is working, we get our stuff, and head back home, but first we must pick up my other car, which had a low tire.

3. After my wife orders the birthday cake for our granddaughter’s birthday, we go to pick up my car at the garage. It has a low tire from a slow leak. I had dropped off my car with the garage en route back to my house because we only live two blocks away. So, I can drop it off, get the tire repaired and pick it up after we get back from our afternoon activities. Before I walked out of their office, I made sure that he knew if he could not reach me at home, then call me on my cell phone. I tell him I just want my tire patched, that is it. No calls all afternoon.

We arrive at the garage that afternoon, the car is parked in front of the office, with the right front tire still low. I go into the office to find out why. They want to sell me two new tires because they say the inside of the tire is shredded. How can it be I ask? The man replied that they tried all afternoon to call me, they called my home phone several times. I told them what was the last thing I said when I left this morning? The mechanic said, “yes, there it is on the work order, your cell phone.” I then told him the car just passed the Virginia safety inspection the week before. Of course new tires for an 1997 XK8 Jaguar are expensive. But, I don’t need new tires, I need the tire patched. I leave frustrated, put air in the tire to make it safe, then drive it home.

Why cannot you just tell people that you just want a specific thing done, and that is what they do? Every time I drop off something like my vehicle, the mechanics always want to find more wrong that you know there is wrong, in order for them to make money.

4. I woke up as always bright and early on Sunday. I went out in our backyard to sit with a cup of hot tea and enjoy watching my six dogs play in our landscaped garden, as if it were their play ground. My wife and I landscaped our small backyard upon my transition period from the Army to retirement. It includes four terraces, a small pond with a fountain and waterfall, two small brick porches, with roses everywhere, growing along the six foot high solid wood fence that surround two sides. One large and one small maple tree complete the private enclosure. The first time anyone sees the backyard, they ask, “who did you pay to do that?” We smile when we respond with, “we did it.”

I finished my tea, and then got my workout bag together, out the door and down to the gym for a good morning lift. I arrive at the Sport and Health club at 0800hrs on Sunday, as they should be open (I glance at the door at the schedule to see if I were not early, and it said “Sunday 8:00AM-9:00PM”). As I get there, the few workers have also just arrived, picking up the newspapers outside, and then filing inside, rushing to open and turn everything on. I don’t think anything of the employees just getting there as I do, it is Sunday morning, and everyone has late days.

I work out doing a “push” day for 40 minutes. After doing several sets of weights (Hammer Strength), followed by several sets of push ups and crunches, I am ready for my next phase, the steam room. I walk into the men’s’ locker room, and see that the steam room door is wide open, but no steam. I must let you know that in late June for two weeks the steam room was rebuilt and redone into a better steam room (five pounds off every session baby). So what is the deal now?

I go find several employees of the gym, and none of them know how to turn on the steam room. I finally get to the acting manager behind the check in/front desk. She says she does not know how to turn on the steam room. So, she tells me, “let me call my boyfriend, he works here and knows how to do it.” Meanwhile, another person, who has just worked out, walks up and tells the acting manager that she would like to leave a note for the manager. The acting manager replies, “well I have worked here three weeks, and I have not seen the manager once.”

Wow, I tell myself, that is &^%$ed up.

Anyway, I go back to the downstairs locker room, and join another guy, who is in the Army, at finding the way to turn on the steam room. After five minutes, I go and find the acting manager who tells me that she had talked to her boyfriend, that we were to find a gray box in the room, and turn that on. I tell her I did not see any, but went back anyway, giving her the benefit of the doubt. Of course, we could not find the gray box. I gave up, and left for home. On the way out, I decided to get myself something from the local Silver Diner, call them for a pick up and drive their way.

5. Once I am in my car, I feel better. I have it timed so I can arrive to pick up my meal, then head home to eat, read my emails, and hang out with my dogs (my wife had stuff going on with her friends) prior to my wife getting home and us going to the granddaughter’s birthday. Though I try to eat right six and half days a week, I want something I really like one day or just one meal a week. I love Silver Diner’s Southwest Griddle. I ordered gravy with it as well (it does not come with it).

I get there, walk in, and though the meal is not ready, no big deal, I pay for it, and read the Washington Post for the next five minutes. I get the bag they have it in, look inside to check the contents, and tell the waiter, that there is no tub of gravy. He points inside at a small container, and tells me that is it. Okay, I said, and drive home.

When I get home, I sit down at my computer, take out everything and lay it out. The gravy container is a little light. I open it up, and no wonder, it is empty. I thought about driving back across to Dale City, but it would take too long. I did a quick scan at the receipt, and yes, I did pay for the extra gravy. I will take care of it when I am nearby later.

6. I ate my Southwest Griddle, which was very good, then rest for a bit in the backyard. I hit the mountain bike trail again, and by the time I returned, then cleaned up, my wife was ready to go and pick up the birthday cake she had ordered the day before, then attend the birthday. We have it time to drive the 30 minutes across the county, along the way pick up ice cream and the birthday cake. We stop at Giant Food bakery. My wife lets me go in because I am quicker and she wants to drive. I go in, call for the baker, and show her the invoice from the day before. She heads off, starts making calls and then comes back to ask me if I can wait? I said “Why?” “Well” she says, the order you wife made, was not done, so we will call the baker in and have him make your order.” With everything else going on, the last two days, I am at my last wits. I walked off, call my wife and let her come in since she made the order to handle this situation.

She handled it very well, got the acting manager, told him the situation along with showing him the original invoice dated the day before. Though she was very upset because she did not want to let her granddaughter down, she stayed calm, but firm. She also worked out a compromise with the acting baker, and put together something, not as nice as what she wanted, but as we would find out later, fill the bill. After my wife presented her case, the acting manager did not blink an eye, and gave us the cake and two gallons of ice cream free (around 50.00 dollars worth).

So we were on our way. And despite a frustrating weekend, Sunday ended nice because a 11 year old girl had a nice birthday.

But, what is the theme of my message here? First, I know I have a great life, and for that I am thankful, compared to many millions of our fellow citizens. But, still, I see a problem, and I got to point it out, along with a solution.

Whenever I talk to business and civilian groups, I tell them how important it is to do periodic counseling. To develop your subordinates. Effective counseling enables them to award and punish their employees. What I encountered over the weekend was not an exception to the rule. Incompetence is so prevalent, that my wife and I or my friend Al Gill and I will always look at each other and say, “there we go again, more incompetence” or “are there any competent people anywhere?”

Since the 1960s, a myriad of law suits, laws, and the encroachment of political correctness has almost sapped our once great work ethic. Today, everyone is told they doing a good job, mediocrity is awarded, and if you try discipline or fire poor employees, there is the threat of lawsuits or someone going “postal.” So, managers today, simply avoid confrontation at all costs. They use “the hope method” when they are at their jobs. Their hope is that there will be no issues they have to confront and deal with. Look at the case of the health club steam room. If the manager had been doing her job (14 years with that company), everyone would know everything on how to prepare the club to be ready when the doors open, not trying to get everything ready as people are walking in. And if they don’t know, they know who to ask or where to look.

So, we wonder why we cannot find presidential candidates who cannot solve the big problems. It is because we cannot even master the small issues in our own backyard.

Boyd’s four elements of grand strategy: How does the last post and others fit into leadership?

don — Sun, 13 Jul 2008 16:48:17 +0000

You may wonder how my comments about our poor strategic leaders and the crisis in resources plays into grand strategy, but how we deal with the unprecedented ramp up in the cost of this most basic of commodities (as close to a tax on breathing as is humanly possible) will affect Boyd’s four elements of grand strategy:

Improve our morale and that of our allies
Degrade that of our opponents
Attract the uncommitted
Without setting the stage for future (unfavorable) conflict.

I use these as guidelines when I address the poor (idiotic-no excuses allowed) strategic choices our nation’s leaders have made in the last 35 years. I also use these when I address adaptability. When I lay these out for my audiences, I have seen naysayers tell me, “…okay, I see that differently now, you have thought it about [this issue] more than I have.” (this is an actual quote from a die hard Republican, an Army officer). Afterward, myself and several others, including this individual had a very good discussion over strategic leadership and Boyd, and how it impacts adaptability.

My friend and fellow bloggers Chet Richards and Fabius Maximus cover these issues in far better detail than I do. I am indebted to them for what they have taught me.

The challenge: We need smart and tough leaders…

don — Sun, 13 Jul 2008 15:20:17 +0000

This is a post I just made to my good friend and mentor, Chuck Spinney.

I declared, Iraq was the strategically second worse decision we have made. The first was not converting our economy to non-oil dependency beginning in the 1970s when we could make it easier to transition. This is a major threat to our national security, and feeds billions of dollars into the hands of dictators and non state terrorists groups. For all the critics of President Carter, he had the moral courage in his 79 speech to point out the need to kick our addiction to oil.

Chuck’s response is below,

At this point in time, there is simply no alternative to oil as a portable store of energy …. nothing comes close to it both thermodynamically and in terms of ease of portability. That said, we can cut consumption by making our usage more efficient … better cars, more insulation and reasonable substitution of alternatives … we will always be dependent on oil suppliers but we can reduce total demand with sensible measures. Look at the chart below — the developed industrial economies in Europe have reduced their consumption, but the US chose not to!!!!!

That is what we should have done when the oil embargo was a cannon shot across our bows … Carter understood this, I think. Now we are in an immoral position of saying demand of economies like China and India (even though their per capital consumption is tiny compared to ours) can or should not grow (even though their per capital consumption is tiny compared to ours), because we want to preserve our profligate life style — it is really disgusting.